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 i 
Abstract 
This thesis responds to the development policy debate on whether the popular Beijing 
Consensus is an alternative, especially for developing countries, to the Washington 
Consensus of market-friendly policies. The advocates of the Beijing Consensus have 
overlooked the facts that China’s development model has much in common with the 
Washington Consensus, China has profited from the globalisation, and the reform for 
establishing a market-oriented economy is the key factor of the rapid development 
and outstanding achievements in China. The critics have reluctantly acknowledged 
the successful strategies employed by the policy makers in Beijing, however, they 
branded China as an authoritarian country, and are wilfully or unintentionally blind to 
the diversity, inclusiveness and competitiveness in the ‘quasi-nonpartisan’ Chinese 
political system. This thesis explain how a farsighted government can increase long-
run growth by fiscal policies, why free market and the ambitious government are not 
contradictory in China, and why so many ‘democratic’ countries violate the first two 
prescriptions of the Washington Consensus: fiscal discipline, and public expenditure 
priority to pro-growth investment. The theoretical analyses show that the strategy of a 
farsighted government is to sacrifice the first several generations but benefit all future 
generations through cutting nonproductive public spending and giving expenditure 
priority to productivity-enhancing expenditure, so that a higher growth rate leads to a 
‘quasi-Pareto improvement’ among generations. Nevertheless, farsighted fiscal policy 
together with ‘hedonistic citizens’ has a side effect, the welfare loss for both the 
government and the citizens. The Barro model is an exception in which a farsighted 
government has no place to increase the growth rate because welfare maximisation 
equals growth maximisation. The empirical results reveal the strong substitution 
relationship between the government and nongovernment capital, and thus the general 
CES technology rather than the Cobb-Douglas technology is the suitable structure 
containing the two types of capital in the production function. However, the 
government capital has become more complementary to the nongovernment capital 
due to the deepening reforms of SOEs and fiscal policies since 1992. 
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 1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Since the end of the Cold War, most politicians and economists have agreed that the 
Washington Consensus has achieved a glorious and definitive victory. The term 
Washington Consensus was first conceived in 1989 by John Williamson to refer to a 
set of ten market-based policy recommendations. Williamson (2002) presents that 
these commonly shared themes promoted by Washington-based institutions, such as 
the IMF, World Bank, and U.S. Treasury Department, were necessary for the 
recovery of Latin American countries from the economic and financial crises in the 
1980s. Subsequent to the minting of the term, it has been fairly widely used as a form 
of neoliberal manifesto which supports the standpoint that market force rather than 
government planning should shape economic outcomes. Some neoliberal scholars 
even argue that the market-democratic capitalism is the best and final model of the 
human society. Nevertheless, since 1990s, the world has experienced multiple 
financial turmoils, economic stagnation, and even the collapse of several nations’ 
economic systems. The most recent and more severe 2008 financial crisis has further 
eroded confidence in the Western. Some economists blame these crises on the 
implementations of the Washington Consensus, and therefore the phrase ‘Beijing 
Consensus’ seems a more popular term in debates about economic and political 
policies. The new conception was coined by Joshua Cooper Ramo (2004) to pose 
China’s development model as an alternative, especially for nations in the Third 
World, to the Washington Consensus of market-friendly policies.  
Before we draw a conclusion on whether China’s national economic strategy is 
disrupting the Washington consensus, we had better review the ten economic policy 
prescriptions: (1) Fiscal discipline with avoidance of large deficits; (2)  Redirection of 
public expenditure from subsidies, especially subsidies to cover the losses of SOEs, 
toward broad-based provision of key pro-growth, pro-poor services such as primary 
education, primary health care and infrastructure development; (3) Reform tax  
system by broadening the tax base and adopting moderate marginal tax rates; (4) 
Liberalising interest rates by market forces; (5) Competitive exchange rates; (6) 
Liberalization of trade; (7) Liberalization of inward foreign direct investment; (8) 
Privatisation of SOEs; (9) Deregulation; (10) Legal security for property rights.  
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From China’s experiences in economic development, we can find that the orientation 
of China’s reform generally follows the ten policy recommendations: 
Currently, China does even better than most capitalist countries in (1), (2), (3), (6) and 
(7), with much low deficits relative to GDP, high ratio of public productive 
expenditures to GDP, relative low tax rates, the crown of global trade champion, and 
the crown of champion in FDI stock (including FDI in Hong Kong). 
China tries its best to fulfill (10) but should do more. In 2011 China received 526,412 
applications, exceeding those in any other country, according to the World Intellectual 
Property Organisation, a UN body which follows 125 patent offices, China accounted 
for 72% of the world’s patent-filing growth between 2009 and 2011. 
China partially accepts the ideas of (4), (5), (8) and (9) by gradual reform rather than 
neoliberal economic shock therapy. Most leaders of the Communist Party assume that 
the free market is powerful and generally efficient but not perfect, so that market 
force should dominate the economic performance but the state with pragmatic policies 
is essential to maintaining social stability and high economic growth in the long run, 
and sometimes protecting free market from the attacks from both domestic and 
foreign speculators. China favors globalisation, meanwhile, maintains economic 
sovereignty and pursues its own priorities. For example, China had privatised, 
restructured and even closed lots of unprofitable SOEs in the 1990s, but now still 
keeps more than 100 state-owned enterprise giants mainly in energy, transportation, 
telecommunication and banking industries. These giants not only provide relatively 
cheap infrastructure and low-interest loan to stimulate the economy, but also keep 
China’s economic independence. Despite regarded as absurd and inefficient monsters 
by many advocators of Washington Consensus, most of these SOEs have performed 
better than their competitors outside China since the 2008 economic crisis; moreover, 
they followed the government’s stimulus policies in the crisis and helped China to 
achieve high growth rates (9.6%, 9.2% and 10.4%) from 2008 to 2010. According to 
the International Comparison Program (2014), hosted by the World Bank, mainland 
China’s economy based on Purchasing Power Parities (PPPs) is forecasted to be the 
world’s largest in 2014, occupying about 17% of the global economy. Ramo (2004) 
emphasises that China actively seeks self-determination from outside pressure, as it is 
imposed by ‘hegemonic powers’ such as the United States. 
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In brief, China’s economic development model has much in common with the 
Washington Consensus; Nevertheless, Chinese government dissents in part from the 
neoliberal ideology or ‘market fundamentalism’. 
Due to China’s high-speed growth in the past three decades, most criticism has been 
focused on the political system in China. Williamson argues that the system is 
authoritarianism as opposed to democracy. Other neoliberals also call it as single-
party system or one-party state. However, these descriptions are inaccurate. The 
characteristics of the political system in China can be summarised as follows:  
Firstly, there are other political parties which participate in the National People’s 
Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, some ministers 
and national leaders are also from these parties.  
Secondly, there is no appreciable distinction of ideology between different parties, but 
there are different viewpoints on how to reform China within each party and among 
ordinary Chinese people. Constant trial and error experimentation is recognized by 
different political factions. Hence, political pluralism does exist in China. 
Thirdly, there is stiff competition among officials. Local performance evaluations are 
based, to a large extent, on economic development and social stability within their 
jurisdictions. Their achievements rather than promises and provocative speeches in 
election campaigns shape their fortunes in political career. 
Fourthly, the collective decision-making mechanism in Politburo is different from the 
system in the United States in which the supreme power is concentrated in the hands 
of the President.  
Fifthly, some Politburo members hold powerful regional positions, thus both central 
enthusiasm and local initiative are stimulated; some competent and relatively young 
successors are elected into the Central Committee and Politburo, therefore both long-
term and immediate interests are taken into account when the Communist Party makes 
decisions. 
Finally, senior officials in the Politburo Standing Committee are in the same age 
group and most are below 70 years old. The President and the Primer would not 
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counteract each other's efforts even they were once competitors, because they only 
have a ten-year tenure and will retire together. They are in the common fate group and 
do not have a second chance after the end of term, so they must cooperate with each 
other after the election.  
Overall, the current political system in China is much close to a nonpartisan system 
feathered by fierce competition before election and fairly close cooperation between 
the top decision makers and their successors and within the Politburo after the 
election. It is also called as a ‘quasi-nonpartisan political system’ in this thesis.  
Why do most people in the world prefer a system with two political monopolies the 
‘Apple Party’ and the ‘Banana Party’ to another system with a big party named the 
‘Fruits Party’? We can not ignore the diversity and competitiveness in the current 
Chinese political system.  
There is no doubt that China should reform the current political system and establish a 
more democratic society. Nevertheless, democracy is not necessary equal to a two-
party or multiparty system.  
Williamson (2002) argues: 
Despite the significant differences in the interpretation of fiscal discipline, I 
would maintain that there is very broad agreement in Washington that large 
and sustained fiscal deficits are a primary source of macroeconomic 
dislocation in the forms of inflation, payments deficits, and capital flight. 
They result not from any rational calculation of expected economic benefits, 
but from a lack of the political courage or honesty to match public 
expenditures and the resources available to finance them. Unless the excess 
is being used to finance productive infrastructure investment, an operational 
budget deficit in excess of around 1 to 2 percent of GNP is prima facie 
evidence of policy failure. 
Williamson has not explained why there is ‘a lack of the political courage or honesty’ 
in a democracy while China, with an ‘authoritarian’ government, can obey the fiscal 
discipline.   
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This thesis is initially motivated to explain why China’s economic model as an 
alternative development philosophy exactly has much in common with the currently 
dominant ideology the Washington Consensus, meanwhile, it is featured by a 
powerful and pro-development state, selective borrowing of foreign ideas and Deng 
Xiaoping’s pragmatic strategies. 
This thesis focuses on the effect of fiscal policies on long-run growth and the 
economic relationship between the government and nongovernment sectors. The 
contents are related to the policy prescriptions (1), (2), (3), (8) and (9) in the 
Washington Consensus. Moreover, this thesis provides the political reasons behind 
how and why a government can increase long-run growth rate through farsighted 
fiscal policies and why politicians in ‘democratic’ countries have a shorter time 
horizon.  
This thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 2 surveys the literature with regard to the 
endogenous growth models with fiscal policies for the theoretical analyses in Chapter 
3, subsequently provides important studies on investment, infrastructure development, 
reforms of SOEs and fiscal policies in China, and the method of indirect inference, as 
the literature for the empirical work in Chapter 4. In Chapter 3, five models are 
employed to illustrate whether it is possible for a farsighted government to increase 
the long-run growth rate. This chapter contributes to the literature with lots of new 
results due to the assumption of self-interested (farsighted or shortsighted) 
government. Chapter 4 investigates the economic relationship between government 
and nongovernment capital in China by the method of indirect inference, revealing the 
strong substitution relationship and thus concludes that the CES structure is better 
than Cobb-Douglas function in describing the economic relationship between the two 
types of capital in the production function. Chapter 5 summarises the important 
results in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, gives a link between the theoretical and empirical 
results, and finally concludes this thesis. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review  
 
2.1 Introduction 
The scope for fiscal policy to affect economic growth is dependent on the underlying 
model of growth. When the Solow-Swan model, which assumes decreasing marginal 
productivities to each input, dominated the neoclassical growth theorists’ view of 
economic development, fiscal policy was powerless in explaining the long-run growth. 
The pioneering work of Barro (1990) opened the window to a rich literature on 
endogenous growth models with fiscal policies. The relevant works are introduced in 
Section 2.2 as the literature for the theoretical analyses in Chapter 3. Section 2.3 
surveys the literature of investment and fiscal policies in China and offers the 
background of national conditions for the empirical work in Chapter 4 which employs 
an exogenous growth model to examine the economic relationship between 
government and nongovernment capital in China. Section 2.4 is also related to 
Chapter 4, it is devoted to a brief review of the literature of indirect inference which is 
used as the methodology of testing and estimating economic models using China’s 
data. Section 2.5 summarises this Chapter. 
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2.2 Growth Models, Fiscal Policies and Ramsey Policy Problem 
 
2.2.1 Exogenous Growth Models 
Following the publication of important papers of Solow (1956) and Swan (1956), 
study of economic growth became one of the central topics of the Economics 
profession until the early 1970s. The key aspect of the Solow-Swan model is the 
neoclassical production function which assumes constant returns to scale with positive 
and decreasing marginal productivities to each input, and a constant-saving-rate rule 
to form a simple general equilibrium model. The limitation of diminishing returns to 
capital makes the Solow-Swan model difficult to explain the long-run per capita 
growth. In the 1960s, some neoclassical growth theorists patched this deficiency up 
by assuming that technological progress occurred in an exogenous manner. This 
modification reconciled the theory with a positive and nearly constant per capita 
growth rate. The exogenous growth model in Arrow and Kurz (1970) assumes that the 
productive public capital stimulates aggregate productivity.  
 
2.2.2 Endogenous Growth Models  
After the mid-1980s, a group of Economic theorists recognized the significance of 
long-run Economic growth and they wanted to find out endogenous mechanics to 
explain long-run growth without appealing to exogenous changes in technology and 
demographic factors. The work of  Arrow (1962),  Uzawa (1965), and  Sidrauski 
(1967) formed the basis for this research. Romer (1986),  Lucas (1988), and Rebelo 
(1991) omit exogenous technological progress, instead, think that growth goes 
indefinitely because investment in human capital has spillover effect on economy and 
escapes the diminishing return to capital accumulation 
The endogenous growth theory is further supported by incorporating imperfect 
competition and R&D activity to the growth model. The important studies in the late 
1980s and early 1990s are Romer (1987, 1990), Aghion and Howitt (1992) and 
Grossman and Helpman (1991). 
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2.2.3 Endogenous Growth with Fiscal Policies 
2.2.3.1 Public Service vs Public Capital  
Barro (1990) introduced a model with a flow of productive public service where the 
growth-maximisation income tax rate coincides with the welfare-maximisation tax 
rate. The framework, as the first endogenous growth model in which productive 
government expenditure determines the long-run growth rate, is frequently cited in the 
literature, and is often modified and extended into different models to explain the 
effects of fiscal policies on the growth. Following Barro (1990), many early studies in 
the literature including Turnovsky (1996) also treat the current flow of public 
spending as the source of contribution to productive capacity. Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1992) summarises three categories of public service as a productive input for private 
poruducers in the literature: publicly-provided private goods which are rival and 
excludable; publicly-provided public goods which are non-rival and non-excludable; 
and publicly-provided goods subject to congestion which are rival but to some extent 
non-excludable. 
However, Barro’s assumption that the public spending as a flow takes a role in the 
macroeconomic production is less plausible from the viewpoint of the work of Arrow 
and Kurz (1970) which argues that the government expenditure only indirectly 
influences the production through a stock of public capital. The empirical studies by 
Aschauer (1989) and Munnell and Cook (1990) defend the assumption of Arrow and 
Kurz. The importance of pubic capital is also presented in the survey of the empirical 
literature by Sturm, Kuper and de Haan (1998).  
Futagami, Morita and Shibata (1993) (abbreviated to ‘FMS’) combined the Barro 
model with Arrow and Kurz’s assumption, showing in that the welfare-maximisation 
tax rate is smaller than the rate that maximises the growth. In addition, they also 
analysed the transitional dynamics of their model and proved the existence of a 
unique steady growth equilibrium with private and public capital. Other studies by 
Baxter and King (1993), Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) and Cassou and Lasing (1998) 
also suggest that the accumulated stock of public capital rather than the flow of 
government expenditure is more relevant to production process.  
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Greiner and Hanusch (1998) extended the FMS model by assuming that the 
productive public spending is divided into investment in public capital and subsidy for 
private investment as in Judd (1985). Moreover, the tax revenue is also used to 
finance lump-sum transfer to the household. Their study concludes that maximising 
growth is not equivalent to maximising welfare on the balanced growth path. 
Ghosh and Roy (2004) combined the Barro model and the FMS model, allowing both 
public service and public capital to exist in the production function. Their study 
explores present-versus-future trade-off in the public sector and emphasises the that 
the effect of the public sector on the economy depends not only on the income tax rate 
but also on the allocation of tax revenues between the public service and the 
accumulation of public capital. Their analysis shows that the growth rate, the share of 
public spending in the output, the proportion of investment in public capital in total 
public spending, and the proportion of private investment in total private spending all 
are lower in the equilibrium outcome than in the centralised optimal outcome. 
2.2.3.2 Productivity Enhancing vs Utility Enhancing 
The public service or public capital is often used to either enhance the private 
productivity, such as Barro (1990), Futagami, Morita and Shibata (1993) and Ghosh  
and Roy (2004), or enhance the utility, such as Xie (1997). Turnovsky and Fisher 
(1995) include both public consumption expenditure and public infrastructure 
expenditure in the same model. 
Different from the previous studies of others, the paper of Chatterjee and Ghosh (2011) 
examines the effect of fiscal policy on macroeconomic performance and welfare by 
assuming that the government collects tax revenue to finance the accumulation of 
public capital which simultaneously provides both productivity and utility enhancing 
services to the private sector.  
Similar to Chatterjee and Ghosh (2011), Misch, Gemmell and Kneller (2013) allow 
for the possibility that public service or public capital entail mixed effects in both 
utility and production. Moreover, their model, as in Devarajan, Swaroop and Zou 
(1996), Baier and Glomm (2001) and Ott and Turnovsky (2006), is based on CES 
technology rather than Cobb–Douglas technology, allowing greater complementarity 
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between productive public spending and private capital. Their work focuses on the 
trade-off between growth and welfare maximisation and points out that the growth-
maximisation tax rate can lie above, below, or on the welfare-maximisation 
equivalent. However, even relatively large differences in growth- and welfare-
maximisation tax rates translate into relatively small differences in growth rates, and, 
in some cases, welfare levels. 
Agénor (2008) provides a more complex endogenous growth framework with 
government spending in both health and infrastructure. Health influences individual 
welfare, in addition to affecting growth through enhancing the productivity of 
individuals; meanwhile infrastructure services affect the production as well as the 
provision of health services. The rate of time preference depends negatively on 
consumption of health services, relative to income. 
2.2.3.3 Congestion 
As argued by Edwards (1990), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Turnovsky (1997), 
Fisher and Turnovsky(1998) and Eicher and Turnovsky (2000), public goods are 
characterized by some degree of congestion. Edwards (1990) proposes five 
congestion models. Eicher and Turnovsky (2000) specify two notions of congestion in 
a growth context: relative congestion and aggregate (absolute) congestion. The former 
indicates the level of services derived by an individual from the provision of a public 
good in terms of his share of individual capital stock in the aggregate capital stock; 
the latter shows how aggregate usage of the service alone influences the services 
received by an individual. 
The commonly cited paper by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) illustrates that income 
tax, as a user fee for rival but non-excludable public goods, prevents the growth rate 
from being too high, something that lump-sum taxation can not achieve. Turnovsky 
(1997) captures congestion effects in a model with public capital and demonstrates 
that a time-varying income tax in the decentralised economy could replicate the first-
best optimum in both short run and long run.  
However, the treatment of congestion is often restricted to its effects on either 
production or utility, depending on whether the public good is used to consumption or 
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investment. Different from the previous studies, the work of Chatterjee and Ghosh 
(2011) allows that congested public capital plays a dual role and shows that the 
consumption tax can be distortionary when the public capital is subject to congestion. 
Optimal fiscal policy involves using both income- and consumption- based tax or 
subsidy policies as corrective instruments for congestion. The optimal fiscal policy 
rules indicate greater flexibility in the choice of corrective policy instruments relative 
to the previous literature where the consumption tax is generally viewed as the least 
distortionary source of public finance. 
Economides, Park, and Philippopoulos (2011) focus on the optimal allocation of tax 
revenues between productive and nonproductive public goods. The numerical results 
reveal that when productivity-enhancing public goods are subject to congestion, if the 
society values more public consumption goods and services, the more growth-
promoting policies the government should choose, in other words, the government 
should give priority to public investment. In a growing economy, the government 
realises that a large tax base is needed to finance the public consumption goods and 
services. Hence, it makes its allocation decision to boost economic growth through 
productive public expenditure and then enlarge the tax base. In other words, a 
nongrowing society cannot afford the provision of public consumption goods and 
services. Only when there are “unrealistically” strong preferences over public 
consumption should the government follow the conventional policy recipe, namely, 
not only to tax more but also to make public consumption occupy a larger share in 
public expenditure. 
2.2.3.4 Tax Categories 
Lump-sum tax only reduces people's available income and it does not interfere with 
the incentive for consumption or capital accumulation. Hence, it is considered to be 
Pareto-efficient in the taxation literature. Barro (1990) demonstrates that lump-sum 
tax could replicate the centralised optimal resource allocation.  
However, lump-sum tax is difficult to be implemented in reality. Therefore, 
distortionary taxes are still the main revenue sources for almost all countries. 
Following Barro (1990) and Futagami, Morita and Shibata (1993), subsequent studies 
by Glomm and Ravikumar (1994), Cassou and Lansing (1998), Turnovsky (1997), 
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Aschauer (2000), and Marrero and Novales (2005) all assume the public revenue is 
from raised from proportional income tax.  
Recently the consumption tax has occupied a significant place in tax reform, 
especially in Japan and the United States. Meanwhile, consumption tax is commonly 
regarded as a non-distortionary fiscal instrument which does not affect private 
economic decisions.  However, the only condition under which consumption tax is 
also distortionary in intertemporal models is when the work-leisure choice is 
endogenously determined, which is illustrated by Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini (1998) 
and Turnovsky (2000). 
Capital tax is also a feasible choice either in the economic theory or in the real world. 
Judd (1985) and Park and Philippopoulos (2005) use capital tax in their models. The 
former focuses on redistributive taxation, rather than as a means of funding public 
goods; while the latter assumes the capital tax is used to finance government 
consumption and production services in an endogenous growth model. 
Chamley (1985) studies optimal wage taxation, exempting capital income from 
taxation, in an economy with infinite horizon. The extension by including capital-
income tax is done by Chamley (1986) who finds that the optimal capital-income tax 
rate is zero in the long run. 
Some studies use at least two tax instruments, for instances, both income tax and 
consumption tax in Chatterjee and Ghosh (2011), both capital- and wage- based fiscal 
instruments in Correia (1996),  taxation from capital, wage and consumption in Jones, 
Manuelli and Rossi (1997) and Renström (1997). 
2.2.3.5 Transitional Dynamics 
Similar to the framework for studying optimal fiscal policies in Barro (1990), the 
models in Barro and Sali-i-Martin (1995), Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Devereux 
and Wen (1998) demonstrate that the optimal income tax rate is time invariant and 
there are no transitional growth dynamics.  
Based on Barro (1990), Futagami, Morita and Shibata (1993) developed a model with 
transitional dynamics by assuming the public capital rather than the public service is 
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used to enhance the private productivity; while the endogenous growth model in Park 
and Philippopoulos (2005) still assumes that the flow of public expenditure affects the 
economic performance, but allows the expenditure to be used to finance both 
consumption and production as Lee (1992) and Cazzavillan (1996) so that there is 
transitional dynamics and a sufficient condition for existence and uniqueness of the 
balanced growth path. 
Recently, lots of endogenous growth models with fiscal policies have transitional 
dynamics, but most of them focus on the properties of long-run general equilibrium, 
such as Ghosh and Roy (2004), Economides and Philippopoulos (2008), Economides, 
Park, and Philippopoulos (2011). 
2.2.3.6 Time Inconsistency vs Time Consistency 
As mentioned by Simaan and Cruz (1973) and Kydland (1977), the open-loop 
solution of a Stackelberg differential game is generally affected by time inconsistency. 
Under open-loop, the government, as the leader in the Stackelberg differential game, 
chooses an optimal policy, constrained by representative private agent as the follower, 
at the beginning of the game.  However, whether the government honor its 
commitment is questioned. The literature on time inconsistency of optimal fiscal and 
monetary policies includes Kydland and Prescott (1977), Calvo (1978), Barro and 
Gordon (1983) and Calvo and Obstfeld (1988).  
The study of  Cellini and Lambertini (2007),  based on the model in Xie (1997), 
proves that optimal fiscal policy and consumption in Stackelberg game are not only 
time consistent but also subgame perfect since the optimal policy is stationary and the 
consumption plan is independent of the state variable from the beginning. 
Ortigueira (2006) introduces the optimal time-consistent tax policy in an exogenous 
growth model with leisure and public consumption in the utility function. Malley, 
Philippopoulos and Economides (2002) characterise the Markov time-consistent tax 
policy in an endogenous growth economy where the government raises tax revenues 
on total income to finance public consumption and production services. However, 
their model has two limitations: the allocation of government spending between 
consumption and production services is exogenously given; and they use a 
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logarithmic utility function and physical capital fully depreciates each period. Under 
these parametric restrictions, the Ramsey policy is not subject to a time consistency 
problem and it is identical with the Markov perfect solution. Novales, Pérez and Ruiz 
(2014) overcome the two restrictions by a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) 
utility function, incomplete depreciation of capital and an endogenously time-varying 
split of government spending between public consumption and production services. 
When comparing the optimal Markov-perfect and Ramsey policies, they find that the 
income tax rate is higher, the share of public consumption in public expenditure is 
higher and economic growth rate is slightly lower under the Markov government than 
their counterparts under the Ramsey government. 
2.2.3.7 First-best Solution vs Second-best Solution 
Many studies compare the second-best solution under decentralised competitive 
equilibrium with the first-best solution for the social planner in a centralised economy 
to check whether the second-best solution is optimal. Barro (1990) finds that the 
income tax rate of the second-best solution equals that of first-best solution, while 
both saving rate and growth rate are higher in the centralised model and a lump sum 
tax can reproduce the first-best allocation. Ghosh and Roy (2004) suggest that saving 
rate, income tax rate and growth rate in the centralised economy are higher than their 
counterparts in the decentralised economy and the optimal outcome attained by the 
social planner can be replicated in a decentralised economy if the public expenditure 
is financed by a consumption tax or a tax on income from labour. Turnovsky (1997) 
demonstrates in his model with congestion effects that a time-varying income tax in 
the decentralised economy could reproduce the first-best optimum in both short run 
and long run. However, Economides, Park, and Philippopoulos (2011) show that the 
government in the decentralised economy can not implement the optimal allocation. 
 
2.2.4 Self-Interested Politicians  
Most studies in the literature assume the objective of the public sector is to maximise 
either the growth rate or the utility attained by the representative household.  
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Barro (1990) considers the alternative that the self-interested government can earn the 
net revenue (the difference between the tax revenue and the expenditure for the 
households) to buy goods and then receive utility by consuming these goods. 
However, this assumption is infeasible in reality, especially in democratic countries 
where politicians must face electoral constraints.  
The work of Ploeg and Klundert (1991) allows the discount factor of politicians to be 
larger than or equal to that of citizens and differ and shows that the behavior of self-
interested politicians raise utility-enhancing public expenditure meanwhile cuts public 
investment and thus reduces the economic growth rate as well as private agents’ 
welfare. This result is concordant with the empirical evidence given by Tanzi and 
Lutz (1993). However, their paper uses flow of public expenditure rather than stock of 
public capital in the production for analytical convenience. It also eliminates the case 
that the government may be more patient than households. Furthermore, it does not 
explain why these short-sighted politicians are condoned by the voters repeatedly in 
representative democracy.  
The model in Acemoglu, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2008) also allows the discount 
factors of households and politicians to differ and uses linear labor and capital taxes to 
finance public expenditure. The result shows that political economy considerations 
made by self-interested politicians lead to a new source of distortions in the resource 
allocation because of the necessity to satisfy the political sustainability constraints; 
when politicians are less patient than the citizens, tax distortions remain even in the 
long run . In Acemoglu, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2010), non-linear taxes are used in a 
dynamic economy subject to a self-interested politician, without any commitment 
power, who is partly controlled by the citizens. The study of Acemoglu, Golosov and 
Tsyvinski (2011) deals with dynamic taxation of capital and labour in the Ramsey 
model and assumes fiscal policies are made by a self-interested politician who can not 
commit to policies. The conclusion is that if the politician is benevolent, the 
Chamley–Judd result of zero long-run taxes still holds; while if the politician is less 
patient than the citizens, the best equilibrium from the viewpoint of the citizens 
involves long-run capital taxation. Similar to Ploeg and Klundert (1991), Acemoglu, 
Golosov and Tsyvinski (2008, 2010, 2011) do not address the case of farsighted 
politicians who are more patient than the citizens.   
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2.3 Investment and Fiscal policies in China 
 
2.3.1 Investment  
After the founding of People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, China turned to the 
Soviet Union as the example of economic development, as well as the chief trading 
partner and technology source. Chinese government developed a massive socialist 
industrial complex through public investment. The state poured resources into capital-
intensive firms to produce metals, machinery, and chemicals. Naughton (2007) labels 
this this development strategy as ‘Big Push industrialization’ since overwhelming 
priority was given to channeling the maximum available investment into heavy 
industry. 
The economic reform was introduced by Deng Xiaoping in 1978. Maddison (2007) 
presents that since the end of 1970s, the share of government investment in total 
investment has experienced a sharp drop and now the private saving (via the banking 
system) rather than the state is the most important source to finance the investment, 
meanwhile the economy has been opened to foreign investment. 
The annual data from National Bureau of Statistics of China show that the share of 
investment in GDP in 1952 is less than 23%. It has been increased to around 48% in 
recent years. Kuijs (2005) investigates the investment and saving in China, suggesting 
that high investment and saving are key features of China’s pattern of growth. The 
study also reveals that investment has been high since 1990 with household and 
government investment stable at rates comparable to other countries, while the 
investment from enterprises, ranging between 27 and 35 percent of GDP, makes 
China’s investment-GDP ratio higher than that in any other large economy. 
Zhou (2007) shows that the incentives at the local level are the key factor that leads to 
large-scale investment projects. Officials in local governments are motivated 
primarily by political considerations. As the performance evaluations in China are 
based, to a large extent, on GDP growth within their jurisdictions, they have a strong 
incentive to promote investment and form favorable business environment for both 
domestic and foreign investors. 
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2.3.2 Infrastructure  
Infrastructure facilities have played an important role in China’s economic 
development, especially after the 1978 reform. Sahoo, Dash, and Nataraj (2010) 
investigate the role of infrastructure in promoting growth in China for the period from 
1975 to 2007 and conclude that infrastructure development has significant positive 
contribution to growth than other types of investment. The investment in 
infrastructure has accounted for a large proportion of GDP, for example, it was about 
14% of GDP in 2006. A massive development of infrastructure facilities has been a 
key factor of China’s sustained high growth and increased competitiveness since the 
1990s. D e´murger (2001) gives empirical evidence on the links between infrastructure 
investment and economic growth in China by using panel data from 24 provinces in 
the period between 1985 and 1998. The empirical results also indicate that transport 
facilities are a key differentiating factor in explaining the economic growth gap 
between different provinces and point to the role of telecommunication in reducing 
the burden of isolation. 
Government investment is most important source of infrastructure development 
especially before the 1978 reform. Sahoo, Dash, and Nataraj (2010) present that direct 
budget spending on urban infrastructure includes expenditures from both central and 
local government. Since urban infrastructure is a local responsibility, a vast majority 
of infrastructure facilities are invested by local governments. 
 
2.3.3 SOEs in China 
After 1949, market forces were replaced by regulatory devices and lots of SOEs were 
built. Maddison (2007) argues that ‘there was a distinct preference for large 
enterprises which were expected to be more vertically integrated than in a capitalist 
market economy’. Almost all investment was carried out by the government and 
SOEs before 1978. At the same time, the SOEs were responsible for providing 
housing, education and health services to workers and even their families. With the 
commitment to full employment, SOEs could not dismiss workers who were 
redundant, lazy or inefficient. 
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However, with the reform in the state-owned sectors, the SOEs have become more 
efficient and competitive. Hay, Morris, Liu and Yao (1994) analyse different aspects 
of behaviours of SOEs in China,  including production and costs, employment, profit 
margins and profitability, finance, investment decisions, and autonomy, and conclude 
that the reform programme was successful and in many respects in the 1980s the 
SOEs began to behave like Western firms. 
In China, the largest four commercial banks are the direct descendants of the planned-
economy bank system. Naughton (2007) investigates the financial system in China 
and points out that the Big Four state-owned commercial banks account for three 
quarters of total banking system assets in 2003. According to Relbanks 2014 statistics 
on largest banks by total assets, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China is the 
largest bank in the world with assets of 3.2 trillion dollars. All of the four state-owned 
commercial banks are among the top ten in the world, together with assets of about 
10.7 trillion dollars. Since 1978, more and more savings from households and 
unincorporated businesses flow into the state-owned commercial banks and these 
banks have become a key channel for household surpluses to be invested by firms. 
 
2.3.4 Tax System 
Before 1978 China had adopted a highly centralised fiscal system. SOEs were 
required to turn most profits to fiscal administrative divisions, and local governments 
must turn over all their revenues to higher governments and finally to the Ministry of 
Finance, which would then allocated the expenditure of the SOEs and local 
governments. Since the beginning of the reform and opening up, the taxation system 
has gone through several important reforms. State Administration of Taxation of 
China (2012) shows that the establishment of foreign-related taxation system were 
made as the breakthrough points of tax reform in the early days of the reform; in 1983 
and 1984, the reform established the distribution relations between the State and the 
enterprises within the taxation system; in 1994, the largest-scale and widest-scope tax 
reform adopted to meet the requirements of socialist market economy system. 
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After several taxation reforms, for the present, China has 19 tax categories, i.e. value 
added tax, consumption tax, business tax, enterprise income tax, individual income 
tax, resource tax, urban and township land use tax, house property tax, city 
maintenance and construction tax, tax on the use of arable land, land appreciation tax, 
vehicle purchase tax, vehicle and vessel tax, stamp tax, deed tax, tobacco leaf tax, 
customs duty, tonnage dues, and fixed assets investment orientation regulatory tax. Of 
which, most tax categories are proportional rather than progressive. The only two 
progressive tax categories are individual income tax and land appreciation tax, 
together occupying 8.6% of the tax revenue in 2012, as shown in National Bureau of 
Statistics of China (2013). 
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2.4 Indirect Inference  
Indirect inference as a simulation-based method provides a statistical criterion for 
rejecting or accepting models. Indirect inference can be used to make inferences about 
the parameters of the structural model by comparing the performance of the auxiliary 
model based on the simulated data from the structure model with the performance of 
the auxiliary model based the actual data. Indirect inference has been well known in 
the literature, since being introduced by Smith (1993). Other influential names are 
Gourieroux, Monfort and Renault (1993), Canova (2005) and Le, Meenagh, Minford 
and Wickens (2011). Gourieroux, Monfort and Renault (1993) name the method of 
indirect inference as ‘incorrect’ criterion in the sense that it does not directly give a 
consistent estimator of the parameters of interest. Indirect inference is useful in 
estimating models for which the likelihood function or other criterion function is 
difficult to evaluate, especially those with nonlinear dynamic structures, or latent 
variables, or incomplete data. 
Minford, Theodoridis and Meenagh (2009) use a VAR model as the auxiliary model 
to test a full open economy model of the UK which has been in forecasting use for 
three decades. The process of testing by indirect inference is to bootstrap the 
structural residuals and generate a large number of sample replications, based on 
which, a distribution of the VAR parameters is obtained, finally test whether the VAR 
parameters from actual data lies within this distribution at some level of confidence. 
The method of indirect inference has also been used to estimate models in many 
studies. Liu and Minford (2014) summarise the basic idea of indirect estimation: to 
choose a set of parameters for the structural model, so that, when this model is 
simulated, it generates estimates of the auxiliary model as close as possible to those 
obtained from actual data. In other words, indirect estimation chooses the structural 
parameters that can minimise the distance between the two sets of estimated 
parameters. 
Detailed procedures of both testing and estimating models by indirect inference, 
together with an example code that deals with a simple three-equation model, are 
given by Le and Meenagh (2013).  
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2.5 Conclusion 
Endogenous growth models contain strong predictions regarding the function of fiscal 
instruments in economic growth. The theoretical literature on the relationship between 
fiscal policies and long-run growth has mainly focused on the effects of public service 
and public capital, productivity-enhancing goods and utility enhancing goods, 
congestion and non-congestion, distortionary taxation and non-distortionary taxation, 
time consistency and time inconsistency. However, few studies illustrate the different 
results with a self-interested government, especially when the government is more 
farsighted than the private sector.  
There is a rich literature about investment and fiscal policies in China. Many studies 
present that the investment was dominated by the government and SOEs between 
1949 and 1978, and the government expenditure was mainly from the state-owned 
sector. Since 1978, there has been a sharp drop in the government size. Today, 
investment is mainly financed from private saving via the state-owned commercial 
banks; market forces play a much bigger role in resource allocation; meanwhile, the 
SOEs become more efficient and competitive; the public investment is mainly used to 
finance the infrastructure development rather than subsidise the operation of state-
owned sector. 
During the last two decades, indirect inference, as a simulation-based method, has 
become more and more influential in testing and estimating economic models. Many 
empirical researchers introduce the procedures of how to use indirect inference, and 
example codes are also offered in the literature.  
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Chapter 3:  How to Increase Long-Run Growth for a 
Farsighted Government   
 
3.1 Introduction 
The pioneering work of Barro (1990) incorporates the flow of public service into 
private production and thus creates the first endogenous growth model in which long-
run economic growth comes from fiscal policy, suggesting that there is an inverted U-
shaped-curve relationship between the public productive expenditure and economic 
growth, as the increasing cost of distortionary taxation which is necessary to finance 
the government spending overtakes the declining benefit of productivity-enhancing 
expeniture. Following Barro (1990), Futagami, Morita and Shibata (abbreviated to 
‘FMS’) (1993) modify Barro’s model by using stock of public capital in the 
production function. Xie (1997) designs a model in which income tax revenue 
finances the public consumption instead of enhancing private productivity. However, 
these authors do not address the consequences of fiscal policies decided by a 
farsighted or shortsighted government. This chapter overcomes these shortcomings 
and gives numerical results of different government time horizons in a model which 
includes both utility-enhancing and productivity-enhancing public goods. The rest of 
this chapter is organised as follows. 
In Section 3.2, a centralised AK model illustrates the resource allocation arranged by 
a farsighted government would sacrifice the first several generations but benefit all 
future generations.  
Section 3.3 goes beyond the previous work of Xie (1997) by adding the centralised 
models and comparing the decentralised and centralised results, incorporating a self-
interested government and comparing the solutions under growth maiximisation, 
benevolent government, farsighted government and shortsighted government. Some 
important results are: (a) The optimal tax rate set by a self-interested government in 
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the open-loop Stackelberg game is not only time consistent, but part of a subgame 
perfect equilibrium. (b) With an impatient government, it is possible that the growth 
rate in centralize model is smaller than the rate in the decentralised model. (c) With a 
farsighted government, the overall utility, the birth of the first benefited person in 
generation utility, the instantaneous utility, all living people’s generation utility 
exceed their counterparts with a benevolent government in chronological order. (d) 
The more farsighted the government is, the faster the overall utility, the generation 
utility and the instantaneous utility exceed their counterparts with a benevolent 
government. (e) The inefficiency is not only due to tax distortion, but also from the 
time-preference difference between the representative and the government.  
Section 3.4 revisit the Barro model and conclude that, with Cobb-Douglas production 
function, the optimal fiscal policy is independent from the government’s time 
preference, which means a farsighted government can not realise a higher growth rate 
by fiscal instrument.  
Section 3.5 extends the FMS model by assuming that the tax rate can be time 
invariant and the government can be self-interested. Moreover this section compares 
the decentralised and centralised results, and concludes that, in both the decentralised 
and the centralised FMS models, a more patient government would tax more to 
accumulate public capital, leading to a higher ratio of public capital to private capital 
and then a higher growth rate. 
Section 3.6 presents a model with both a flow of public service in utility function and 
a stock of public capital in production function and illustrates that a farsighted 
government can increase long-run growth rate by two fiscal channels: reducing the 
ratio of unproductive public spending in GDP and increasing the ratio of productivity-
enhancing public expenditure in GDP. 
Section 3.7 discusses the result of this chapter, and gives conclusions, including the 
reason why why so many ‘democratic’ counties violate the first two prescriptions of 
the Washington Consensus: fiscal discipline and public expenditure priority to pro-
growth investment; in contrast, the farsighted leaders in Singapore and China have 
pragmatic concern with serving the long-run benefits of their people. 
The appendix shows the basic structure of this chapter and presents important results.   
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3.2 Increase the Growth in the Simplest Centralised AK Model  
The purpose of this section is to illustrate the concept of ‘quasi-Pareto improvement 
among generations’ by a farsighted government. This section adopts a simple AK 
model without fiscal instrument. Capital in the AK model is broadly defined to 
encompass physical and human capital. Both the centralised and decentralised 
solutions are presented. The centralised solutions of saving rate and growth rate 
depend on whether the government is farsighted, benevolent or shortsighted.  
 
3.2.1 The Structure of the Centralised AK Model 
In a centralised economy, the government controls the allocation of resources between 
representative’s consumption and investment. The representative is a consumer-cum-
producer who produces a single good which is either consumed or invested as capital 
for later production. 
The objective of the government is to maximise the representative’s intertemporal 
utility with the government’s own rate of time preference: 
  
0
0G
t
Ge u c dt here
 

   (2.1) 
   lnu c c  (2.2) 
where 𝑐  is the representative’s consumption, 𝜌𝐺  is the government’s rate of time 
preference which is potentially different from the representative’s rate of time 
preference  𝜌. 
A shortsighted (impatient) government is less patient than the citizens, hence 
 G   (2.3) 
A longsighted (patient) government is more patient than the citizens, hence 
 G   (2.4) 
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The representative is a household-producer who produces 𝑦 with the AK model. 
  y f k Ak   (2.5) 
where 𝑘  is capital, the initial capital 𝑘(0) > 0 is given, 𝐴  is a technological scale 
factor. 
With zero depreciation rate, the budget constraint is  
 k y c Ak c     (2.6) 
 
3.2.2 The Centralised Equlibrium 
The government maximises (2.1) the representative’s intertemporal utility with the 
government’s own rate of time preference, subject to the budget constraint (2.6). To 
solve the government’s problem, set up the current-value Hamiltonian: 
  lnG kH c y c    (2.7) 
𝜆𝑘 is the dynamic multiplier associated with (2.6). 
The transversality condition is  
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First order conditions: 
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2.9
G
k
G
k G k k
H
a
c c
H y
b
k k

   

  

 
  
 
 (2.9) 
 (2.9a) and (2.9b) imply 
 G
c y
c k


 

 (2.10) 
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(2.5) and (2.10) imply 
 G
c
A
c
   (2.11) 
Hence the consumption growth rate is a constant. A positive consumption growth rate 
imply  
 0GA    (2.12) 
The condition of bounded utility is  
 lim G
t
u
u


  (2.13) 
(2.2) imply 
  
1 1
ln
G
u
c
u cc A
u u u c c


      (2.14) 
(2.13) and (2.14) imply 
 lim exp G
t
G
A
c


 
  
 
 (2.15) 
This inequality condition is satisfied since (2.11) and (2.12) ensure a constant positive 
growth rate. 
 
3.2.3 Proof of Balanced Growth Path 
(2.6) and (2.9b) imply 
 k G
k
A



   (2.16) 
Hence 
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    0 G A tk k e

 

  (2.17) 
(2.6) and (2.9a) imply 
 
1
k
k Ak

   (2.18) 
(2.17) and (2.18) imply 
 
 
 1
0
GA t
k
k Ak e



   (2.19) 
The solution of 𝑘 is  
 
 
   
 
1 1
0
0 0
GA t At
k G k G
k e k e

   

 
   
  
 (2.20) 
(2.17) and (2.20) imply 
    
1 1
0 0 G
t
k k
G G
k k e
 
 
 
   
 
 (2.21) 
Substitute (2.21) into the transversality condition (2.8), we have 
    
1
0 0k
G
k

  (2.22) 
Substitute (2.22) into (2.20), it can be seen that the second term in (2.20) is zero and 
hence the equilibrium is on balanced growth path (BGP). 
 C G
k c y
A
k c y
       (2.23) 
where 𝛾𝐶  is the growth rate of all the three variables, the subscript ‘C’ denotes 
‘centralised model’. 
(2.9a), (2.22) and (2.23) imply 
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 G
c
k
  (2.24) 
Hence 
 
     
     
     
0 2.25
0 2.25
0 2.25
G
G
G
A t
A t
G
A t
k k e a
c k e b
y Ak e c










 (2.25) 
The saving ratio is  
 GC
Ak k k
s
y k y A

     (2.26) 
 
3.2.4 Comparison  
In the decentralised model, the representative rather than the government makes 
decision on the resource allocation. It is straightforward to derive the growth rate and 
saving rate in the decentralised model by replacing 𝜌𝐺  by 𝜌. 
 
D A    (2.27) 
 D
A
s
A

  (2.28) 
Assume: 
 
 
 
 
2.29
2.29
2.29
G GP
G GI
G GB
for a patient government a
for a impatient government b
for a benevolent government c
  
  
  
 
 
 
 (2.29) 
Hence, we have 
 
 
 
2.30
2.30
CI CB D CP
CI CB D CP
a
s s s s b
     
  
 (2.30) 
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Proposition 3.2 A:  
In the centralised model, the saving rate and growth rate are larger than, or 
equal to, or smaller than their counterparts in the decentralised model if the 
government is more patient than, or as patient as, or less patient than the 
representative.  
 
3.2.5 Experiment  
Assume the representative is a family with infinite generations. We set  𝐴 = 1.5, the 
inter-generational rate of time preference 𝜌 = 0.5 , and 𝑘(0) = 1 . Table 1 
demonstrates the effect of government’s rate of time preference 𝜌𝐺  on consumption 𝑐 
and instantaneous utility 𝑢 of different generations. 
Table 1: Effect of  𝜌𝐺  on Consumption and Welfare of Different Generations 
Generation  1 2 3 4 5 10 
Farsighted c 0.30 1.00 3.31 10.98 36.45 14706.24 
𝜌𝐺 = 0.3 u -1.20 0.00 1.20 2.40 3.60 9.60 
Benevolent c 0.50 1.36 3.69 10.04 27.30 4051.54 
𝜌𝐺 = 0.5 u -0.69 0.31 1.31 2.31 3.31 3.61 
Shortsighted c 0.70 1.56 3.47 7.72 17.17 2086.67 
𝜌𝐺 = 0.7 u -0.36 0.44 1.24 2.04 2.84 7.64 
We treat the solutions with benevolent government as the benchmark and conclude 
that the first several generations are worse off (with respect to consumption and 
instantaneous utility) if the government is farsighted while all future generations are 
better off; The first several generations are better off under a shortsighted government, 
but all future generations are worse off. 
In the centalised regime where the government is more patient than the citizens, the 
resource allocation sacrifices the first several generations but benefits all future 
generations. It is a ‘quasi-Pareto improvement’ among generations when compared 
with the case with a benevolent government.   
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3.3 Increase the Growth in a Model with Nonproductive Public 
Expenditure 
This section develops a model similar to Xie (1997), but there is no restriction on 
whether the government is benevolent or self-interested. With a self-interested 
government, the optimal fiscal policy and consumption are both time consistent and 
subgame perfect. This conclusion is the same as that under a benevolent government. 
Moreover, in both the decentralised and centralised models, the less patient a 
government is, the higher the optimal tax rate is, and the lower the growth rate is. If 
the government is very impatient, the growth rate in the centralised model is smaller 
than the rate in the decentralised model. 
 
3.3.1 The Structure of the Xie Model 
The objective of the representative is to maximise his intertemporal utility: 
 
0
0te udt here 

   (3.1) 
  , ln ln 0u c h c h here     (3.2) 
where 𝑐 is consumption, ℎ is the flow of public consumption expenditure, 𝜌 is the rate 
of time preference, 𝜑 is the weight given to public consumption service relative to 
private consumption. (Note: 𝜑 = 1 in Xie (1997).)  
The model assumes that the public consumption is provided without user charges and 
not subject to congestion. 
The representative is a household-producer who produces 𝑦 with the AK model. 
  y f k Ak   (3.3) 
where 𝑘  is capital, the initial capital 𝑘(0) > 0 is given, 𝐴  is a technological scale 
factor. 
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The government’s budget constraint is  
 0 1h y here     (3.4) 
where 𝜏 is the income tax rate that can be time variant if necessary for optimisation.  
With zero depreciation rate, the budget constraint is  
    1 1k y c Ak c        (3.5) 
 
3.3.2 Decentralised Competitive Equilibrium 
The representative household-producer maximises his intertemporal utility, given tax 
rate 𝜏 and public consumption service ℎ. To characterise the representative’s response 
to the fiscal policy by a set of first order conditions and a transversality condition, set 
up the current -value Hamiltonian firstly: 
  ln ln 1kH c h y c          (3.6) 
The transversality condition is  
 lim 0t k
t
e k 

  (3.7) 
First order conditions: 
 
 
   
1
0 3.8
1 3.8
k
k k k
H
a
c c
H y
b
k k

   

  

 
   
 
 (3.8) 
 (3.8a) and (3.9b) imply 
  1
y c
k c
 

  

 (3.9) 
 (3.9) is the Euler equation which can be written as  
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  1
y
c c
k
 
 
    
 (3.10) 
(3.3) and (3.10) imply 
  1c c A       (3.11) 
  1
c
A
c
       (3.12) 
(3.11) and (3.5) constitute the decentralised competitive equilibrium (DCE): 
 
   
   
1 3.13
1  3.13
c c A a
k Ak c b
 

    
  
 (3.13) 
The system (3.13) expresses the motion of consumption 𝑐 and capital 𝑘 as functions 
of government policy instrument 𝜏. 
Substitute (3.8a) into (3.13b), we have  
  1 1k kk Ak      (3.14) 
(3.3) and (3.8b) imply 
  1k k A         (3.15) 
Multiply both sides of (3.15) by 𝑘, we have 
  1k kk A k         (3.16) 
The sum of (3.14) and (3.16) gives 
 
 
1
k
k k k
d k
k k k
dt

        (3.17) 
Hence the solution of 𝜆𝑘𝑘 is  
 
1 t
kk Be


   (3.18) 
 33 
It is necessary to set 𝐵 = 0 so that the transversality condition (3.7) can be satisfied. 
Hence, 
 
1
kk

  (3.19) 
Substitute (3.8a) into (3.19), we have 
 
c
k
  (3.20) 
(3.5) and (3.20) imply 
  1
k
A
k
     (3.21) 
Hence the CDE (3.13) becomes 
 
   
   
1 3.22
1  3.22
c c A a
k k A b
 
 
    
    
 (3.22) 
The solution is  
 
      
      
0
0
0 exp 1 3.23
0 exp 1 3.23
t
t
k k A d a
c k A d b
   
    
    
    


 (3.23) 
If the tax rate τ is a constant, (1 − 𝜏)𝐴 can be treated as a technological scale factor 
for the representative. As in Section 3.2, the whole economy is on the BGP.  
Hence, the long-run growth rate is  
  1D
k c h y
A
k c h y
          (3.24) 
On BGP, the consumption-capital ratio is  
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c
k
  (3.25) 
On BGP, the saving rate is 
 
 
 
1
1D
Ak k k
s
y k y A A
  

 
        (3.26) 
On BGP, the after-tax saving rate is 
 
 
 
 
   
1 1
1 1
1 1 1
A
D D
Ak
s s
y A A
  

  
  
     
  
 (3.27) 
 
3.3.3 Decentralised Equilibrium with Growth Maximisation 
(3.12) implies that if the growth rate reaches the maximum, the government should 
not impose tax. Hence 
 0DG   
The ratio of public consumption to private consumption is  
 0DG
DG
h
c
  
where the subscript ‘DG’ denotes ‘Decentralised model with Growth maximisation’.  
In this model, the government spending is nonproductive and enters the utility 
function. Hence, the growth is maximised when there is no nonproductive expenditure. 
The solution of 𝛾𝐷𝐺 is 
 DG A    
The saving rate under the growth maximisation is 
 DG
A
s
A

  
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Since the tax rate is zero, the after-tax saving rate under the growth maximisation is 
 
A
DG DG
A
s s
A

   
Summary: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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3.28
3.28
0 3.28
3.28
3.28
DG
DG
DG
DG
DG
DG
DG
A
DG
a
A b
c
c
k
h
d
c
A
s e
A
A
s f
A

 




 






 (3.28) 
 
3.3.4 Decentralised General Equilibrium with a Self-Interested Government 
For a benevolent government in the decentralised economy, the problem is to run the 
public sector to maximise its citizens’ intertemporal utility; while a self-interested 
government has its own utility function. The difference between the two intertemporal 
utility functions is just that the government has a different rate of time preference. 
 
0
0G
t
G Ge udt here and
   

    (3.29) 
In the Stackelberg play, the government chooses a sequence of tax rates at date zero to 
maximise its intertemporal utility (3.29), subject to is budget constraints (3.4), the 
representative’s budget constraint (3.5) and the Euler equation (3.11). 
The current-value Hamiltonian for the government is  
 
   
 
ln ln 1
1
GS
k
c
H c Ak Ak c
c A
   
  
      
    
 (3.30) 
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First order conditions: 
 
 
   
   
0 3.31
1 3.31
1
1 3.31
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k c
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k G k k
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k c G c c
H
A k A c a
H
A b
k k
H
A c
c c

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
    
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
   


    


        
 (3.31) 
(3.31a)-(3.31c) imply 
 
 
 
   
   
3.32
1 3.32
1
1 3.32
k c
k k G
c k c G
a
A k c
A b
k
A c
c


 

   
     


     
       
 (3.32) 
Multiply all terms of (3.22b) by 𝜇𝑘, we have 
  1k kk k A         (3.33) 
Multiply all terms of (3.32b) by 𝑘, we have 
  1k k Gk k A           (3.34) 
Sum up (3.33) and (3.34), we have 
 
 
 kk k k G
d k
k k k
dt

           (3.35) 
The solution of 𝜇𝑘𝑘 is 
  
1
G t
k
G
k Q e
 

 

 

 (3.36) 
where 𝑄1 is a constant. 
(3.20) and (3.36) imply 
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 
1
G t
k
G
Q e
c
  

 
 
  
 
 (3.37) 
Substitute (3.37) into (3.32c), we have  
 
   1
1
+ 1G
t
c c G
G
Q e A
c c
  
    
 
 
          
 (3.38) 
Multiply all terms of (3.38) by 𝑐, we have 
    11 + 1G
t
c c G
G
c Q e c A
 
     
 

       
 (3.39) 
Multiply all terms of (3.11) by 𝜇𝑐, we have 
  1c cc c A         (3.40) 
Sum up (3.39) and (3.40), we have 
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G tc
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d c
c c c Q e
dt
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 
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
 (3.41) 
The solution of 𝜇𝑐𝑐 is 
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 (3.42) 
where 𝑄2 is a constant. 
Substitute (3.36) and (3.42) into (3.32a), we have 
 
2
1
Gt
G
A Q e






 
 
 
 (3.43) 
To satisfy the condition 𝜏 ≥ 0 for any 𝑡 including when 𝑡 tends to infinity, we must 
set 𝑄2 = 0, and then we have the solution of 𝜏 in the decentralised equilibrium with a 
self-interested government as   
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 1
G
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 

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

 
The growth rate is  
  
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G
DS DS A A
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The solution of the ratio of public consumption to private consumption is  
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The saving rate is 
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The after-tax saving rate is 
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Summary: 
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 
 (3.44) 
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(3.19) shows that, at any instant, the co-state variable of the representative (follower) 
𝜆𝑘 is independent of the tax rate 𝜏𝐷𝑆 set by the government (leader), hence the game is 
time consistent. (See Karp and Lee (2003).)  
(3.44a) reveals that the tax rate 𝜏𝐷𝑆 is dependent of the capital at any instant, hence 
the optimal tax rate is subgame perfect. 
Propostition 3.3A:  
The optimal tax rate set by the self-interested government in the open-loop 
Stackelberg game is not only time consistent, but part of a subgame perfect 
equilibrium, which ensures the DCE is on the BGP.  
 
3.3.5 Decentralised General Equilibrium with a Benevolent Government 
In the literature, the policy adopt by the benevolent government in a decentralised 
model is often called as ‘second-best optimal policy’. (See, for example, Economides, 
Park, and Philippopoulos (2011).) The solution with a benevolent government is just a 
special case of the general solution with a self-interested government when 𝜌𝐺 = 𝜌. 
(See Cellini and Lambertini (2007) for details, they gives the solution for = 1 .) 
It is straightforward to give the summary below: 
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 (3.45) 
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Hence, (3.44) is a general solution that is suitable for the benevolent government, thus 
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 (3.46) 
Propostition 3.3B:  
In the decentralised Xie model, the less patient a government is, the higher the 
optimal tax rate is set, and the lower the growth rate reaches. 
The tax rate under an impatient government is higher than that under a benevolent 
government, which reduces the disposable income, while the consumption-capital 
ratio is independent on the government’s discount rate, thus less saving is used to 
accumulate capital, and finally higher tax stunts the economic growth. 
A shortsighted government is inclined to promote public consumption and thus 
reduces the economic growth rate. The reason is that the politicians face uncertainty 
about election in a democratic society and thus have a shorter time horizon than 
citizens. In reality, government policies are more complex than the Xie model. With 
imperfect information, people are difficult to calculate the effects of these policies on 
the welfare of themselves and their children. Politicians know the shortsighted 
policies would reduce the welfare of the citizens, but they can dress up their 
statements to lead the gullible voters up the garden path.  
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3.3.6 Centralised General Equilibrium with Growth Maximisation  
Obviously, maximising the growth rate in the centalised model imply the social 
planner does not have expenditure, hence the model is the same as that in Section 3.2, 
or the solution is just the one in 3.3.3 modified by replacing 𝜌 by 𝜌𝐺: 
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 (3.47) 
 
3.3.7 Centralised General Equilibrium with a Self-Interested Government 
The current-value Hamiltonian for the government is  
    ln ln 1GS kH c Ak Ak c           (3.48) 
First order conditions: 
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 (3.49) 
(3.49a)-(3.49d) imply 
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Multiply all terms of (3.50d) by 𝜇𝑘 and use (3.50c), we have 
 
 1 1k kk k A      (3.51) 
Multiply all terms of (3.50b) by 𝑘, we have 
  1k k Gk k A           (3.52) 
Sum up (3.51) and (3.52), we have 
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The solution of 𝜇𝑘𝑘 is 
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where 𝑄3 is a constant. 
Substitute (3.54) into (3.50a), we have 
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To satisfy the condition 𝜏 ≥ 0 for any 𝑡 including when 𝑡 tends to infinity, we must 
set 𝑄3 = 0, then 𝜏 in the centralised equilibrium with a self-interested government is   
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 (3.56) 
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(3.50a), (3.50c) and (3.56) imply 
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The above constant ratios imply the equilibrium is on BGP, hence we have  
 CS G
k c h y
A
k c h y
        (3.57) 
Summary: 
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If the government is benevolent, in other words, 𝜌𝐺 = 𝜌, we replace 𝜌𝐺  by 𝜌 in (3.58) 
to obtain the solution. 
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 (3.59) 
Propostition 3.3C:  
In the centralised Xie model, the less patient a government is, the higher the 
optimal tax rate is set, and the lower the growth rate is. 
 
3.3.8 Compare Decentralised Outcome with Centralised Outcome when the 
Government Is Self-Interested  
From (3.44) and (3.58), we find the tax rate in the centralised model coincides with 
that in the decentralised model. If 𝜌𝐺 ≤ 𝜌, the government is farsighted or benevolent, 
we have  
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 (3.60) 
In the centralised model, the ‘dictatorial’ government can order the representative to 
allocate more disposable income in saving (investment) rather than consumption, 
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when compared with the allocation in the decentralised model. There are two reasons: 
the government, as a social planner, exploits the externality; the government is more 
patient than the representative (when 𝜌𝐺 < 𝜌).  
However, the growth rate in the centralised model is not always higher than that in the 
decentralised model, which is different from the conclusions of other researchers in 
the literature since they assume the government is benevolent. If the government is 
extremely impatient, it may command the representative to allocate more disposable 
income in private consumption. The share of consumption in the disposable income is 
higher than the share in the decentralised model, which lowers the saving rate and 
further reduces the growth rate. 
Compare (3.44) with (3.58), we have  
  1A ACS DS CS DSCS DS CS DS CS DS G
CS DS CS DS
c c h h
s s s s if
k k c c
            (3.61) 
Propostition 3.3D:  
If 𝝆𝑮 > (𝟏 + 𝝋)𝝆, the growth rate in the centralised model is smaller than the 
rate in the decentralised model. 
 
3.3.9 Effect of the Government’s Time Preference on Welfare in the 
Decentralised Model 
We can regard the representative as a representative family with infinite generations 
and assume: 
(a). There are infinite families in the economy. 
(b). Each family has one member at any time. 
(c). The dates of birth are randomly distributed among different families, some people 
are born before date zero. 
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(d). Each generation survives for 𝑙 periods and dies when the next generation is born 
so that each family has one living member. 
Define the critical date ?̅? as the threshold of the instantaneous utility with a farsighted 
government surpassing that with a benevolent government.  
Define the critical date x⃛ as the threshold of date of overall utility with a farsighted 
government surpassing that with a benevolent government. At date x̅, the overall 
utility with a farsighted government has surpassed that with a benevolent government 
since future instantaneous utility with a farsighted government is higher, hence 
 x x  (3.62) 
Define the critical date ?̃? as the date of birth of the first person who will be benefited 
from the farsighted fiscal policy with respect to ‘generation utility’ (the overall utility 
in one generation, see (3.80) or (3.81) below). There are infinite families and people 
in the economy, hence, the time when the first beneficiary’s generation utility with a 
farsighted government surpasses his generation utility with a benevolent government 
must be the date of his death ?̃? + 𝑙. (Otherwise at least one person born before ?̃? has 
benefited from the farsighted government in terms of generation utility before ?̃? + 𝑙, 
but it is impossible.) At date ?̃? + 𝑙, all living people are born after ?̃?, hence ?̃? + 𝑙 is 
the first date when all living people are beneficiaries of the farsighted policy. 
At date ?̅?, no one has already benefited from the farsighted fiscal policy with respect 
to ‘generation utility’ because, before ?̅?, all died and living people have suffered from 
the farsighted fiscal policy since the instantaneous utility is lower than that with a 
benevolent government. At date ?̅? + 𝑙, all living people have had higher instantaneous 
utility since they are born. Hence,  
 x x l x l     
 x x x l x l      (3.63) 
Divided the welfare (overall utility) at date x⃛ into two parts 
      x x l x lU x U x U x      (3.64) 
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The first part is the discounted utility from 𝑥 to𝑥 + 𝑙, the second part is the discounted 
utility after 𝑥 + 𝑙. At date 𝑥, the overall utility with a farsighted government is equal 
to that with a benevolent government. Hence  
    DS DBU x U x  (3.65) 
Farsighted policy leads to higher growth, hence 
    x l x lDS DBU x U x
     (3.66) 
(3.65) and (3.66) imply 
    x x l x x lDS DBU x U x
     (3.67) 
At date 𝑥, the new born people’s generation utility with a farsighted government will 
be still less than that with a benevolent government. Hence  
 x x  (3.68) 
(3.63) and (3.68) imply 
 x x x x l     (3.69) 
Proposition 3.3E: 
With a farsighted government, the overall utility, the birth of the first benefited 
person in generation utility, the instantaneous utility, all living people’s 
generation utility exceed their counterparts with a benevolent government in 
chronological order. 
Since the economy is on BGP, the instantaneous utility for the citizens at date 𝑥 is 
         , ln 0 ln 0x xu c x h x c e h e          (3.70) 
(3.3), (3.4) and (3.44c) imply that the instantaneous utility is 
           , 1 ln 0 ln lnu c x h x k x A            (3.71) 
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(3.44a), (3.44b) and (3.71) imply 
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?̅? is obtained by solving  
          , ,DS DS DB DBu c x h x u c x h x  (3.73) 
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From (3.74), we have 
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The BGP welfare of the representative is calculated as the overall utility expressed by 
a formula including relevant parameters, growth rate, the given value of initial private 
capital (initial value of the state variable), and sometimes ratios of relevant variables 
to private capital. (See Barro (1990) and Misch, Gemmell and Kneller (2013).) 
The welfare for the citizens at date 𝑥 is 
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Substitute (3.44b) into the above equation, we have 
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 (3.76) 
𝑥 is obtained by solving  
    DS DBU x U x  (3.77) 
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Hence  
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From (3.78), we have 
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The generation utility for the generation born at date 𝑥 is 
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The generation utility can be written as 
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?̃? is obtained by solving  
    DS DBU x U x  (3.82) 
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From (3.83), we have 
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(3.74), (3.78) and (3.83) also prove (3.69). 
Prove: 
1
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Set 
1 1
zq e z    
1 0q  if 0z  , 
1 0
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


if 0z  , 1 0
q
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

if 0z  . 
1 1 0
zq e z      if 0z  . 
1 0le l     since 0l   
1 0l le le       
1 0l le le       
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(3.74), (3.79) and (3.84) imply the below proposition. 
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Proposition 3.3F: 
The more farsighted the government is, the faster the overall utility, the 
generation utility and the instantaneous utility exceed their counterparts with a 
benevolent government. 
 
3.3.10 Welfare Loss with Conflicting Time Preferences  
From (3.76), we have, at the beginning, the welfare of the representative family is  
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 (3.87) 
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 
  
     
   (3.88) 
(3.88) implies that the representative family has welfare loss when the government is 
not benevolent.  
The government’s intertemporal utility is  
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If the representative family is obedient and set its time preference equal to the 
government’s, then the government is ‘benevolent’ again, and the government’s 
intertemporal utility becomes 
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 (3.90) 
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We have 
    
  
'
11
0 0 ln ln 0
GG G
DS DB G
G G
U U
  
 
 
  
     
 
 (3.91) 
As illustrated before, the Pareto optimal resource allocation can be realised in the 
centralised models and the Ramsey solutions in the decentralised models are second 
best. In other words, welfare loss arises due to the tax distortion in the decentralised 
models. However tax distortion is not the only reason of inefficient allocation, welfare 
loss is also from different time preferences between the representative and the 
government. For the representative, he currently prefer a benevolent government; 
while the patient government hopes the citizens are obedient and adjust their time 
preference to the same level of the government’s. 
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3.4 No Chance to Increase the Growth in a Model with Productive 
Public Service 
Barro (1990) extended the previous endogenous growth models to incorporate the 
flow of productive public service in the production function. The elasticity of 
substitution in Cobb-Douglas function is unity, resulting in that the growth-
maximisation income tax rate is also the rate which maximises the intertemporal 
utility of the representative, therefore, a government can not increase the growth rate 
even if it is more patient than the representative. 
 
3.4.1 The Structure of the Barro Model 
The objective of the representative household-producer is to maximise his 
intertemporal utility： 
  
0
te u c dt


  (4.1) 
   lnu c c  (4.2) 
where 𝑐 is consumption,  𝜌 is the rate of time preference. 
The household-producer produces 𝑦 according to a Cobb-Douglas technology. 
   1,y f k g Ak g    (4.3) 
where 𝑘 is private capital and 𝑔 is the flow of public service. 𝑘(0) = 𝑘0 > 0  is given, 
𝐴 is a technological scale factor, α and 1 − 𝛼 are the output elasticities of 𝑔 and 𝑘, 
respectively. 
The government’s budget constraint is  
 0 1g y here     (4.4) 
where 𝜏 is the income tax rate.  
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The household-producer’s budget constraint is  
  1k y c    (4.5) 
 
3.4.2 Decentralised Competitive Equilibrium 
The representative maximises his intertemporal utility, given 𝜏 and 𝑔. To solve the 
representative’s problem, set up the current-value Hamiltonian 
  ln 1kH c y c        (4.6) 
The transversality condition is  
 lim 0t k
t
e k 

  (4.7) 
The first order conditions are 
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(4.8) implies 
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(4.9) is the Euler equation which can be written as  
  1
y
c c
k
 
 
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 (4.10) 
The DCE is: 
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(4.3) and (4.4) imply 
  
1
1
g
A
k
   (4.12) 
Substitute (4.12) into (4.11), the DCE is 
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3.4.3 Long-Run Growth-Maximisation Policy 
(4.13) shows that as long as the tax rate 𝜏 is constant, the DCE is on BGP. Hence 
 
y c k g
y c k g
     (4.14) 
(4.13a) and (4.14) imply that the long-run growth rate is  
    
1
1 11 1A

           (4.15) 
To maximise the growth rate γ, we have the solution for tax rate τ 
 DG   (4.16) 
Hence the maximum growth rate is 
  
1
2
1 11DG A

         (4.17) 
 
3.4.4 Decentralised General Equilibrium Solution 
The government chooses a sequence of tax rates at date zero to maximise the 
representative’s intertemporal utility with the government’s own time preference as 
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below. If the government is self-interested, then 𝜌𝐺 ≠ 𝜌 ; if the government is 
benevolent, then 𝜌𝐺 = 𝜌. 
 
0
0G
t
Ge udt here
 

   (4.18) 
The current-value Hamiltonian for the self-interested government is 
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First order conditions are 
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 (4.20) 
(4.20a) implies the solution of the tax rate is 
 DS   (4.21) 
𝜌𝐺  does not enter the solution of the tax rate even the government is benevolent. 
Proposition 3.4A: 
With Cobb-Douglas production function in Barro model, the fiscal policy is 
independent of either the representative’s or the government’s time preference. 
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3.4.5 Discussion  
The solution 𝜏 = 𝛼 is of the below characters: 
(a) It is dependent on neither the representative’s time preference nor the 
government’s.  
(b) It is the solution for both growth maximisation and utility maximisation. 
(c) It is optimal in both short run and long run since it maximises both one-period and 
overall utility. 
(d) It is both second-best and first-best solutions. In the centralised model, the growth 
rate is higher, but the optimum solution of tax rate is still the same as that in the 
decentralised model. (See Barro (1990) for details.) 
(e) It is optimal for both household-producer and the government; it is optimal for 
both benevolent and self-interested government. 
Since the Ramsey second-best solution is also the growth-maximisation solution in 
the Barro model, the government can not increase the growth rate even if the 
government is more farsighted than the citizens. Furthermore, it is still impossible for 
a patient government to increase the economic growth by fiscal instrument in the 
centralised model, which coincides with the conclusion of Devarajan, Swaroop and 
Zou (1996): ‘productive expenditures, when used in excess, could become 
unproductive’. The key is that the elasticity of substitution in Cobb-Douglas 
production function is unity and thus maximising the growth rate is efficient. When a 
general CES production function is used in the Barro model, the tax rate set by the 
benevolent government will be smaller than the rate that maximises the growth rate if 
the elasticity of substitution is less than unity. (See Devarajan, Swaroop and Zou 
(1996) and Misch, Gemmell and Kneller (2013), their models use a general CES 
technology.) When the growth-maximisation tax rate lies above the welfare-
maximisation equivalent, a farsighted government would achieve a higher growth rate 
than the benevolent government. (The detailed comparison under CES production 
function with a flow of public productive expenditure is not given here since the 
purpose of this section is to illustrate that in some special case, the discount rate of the 
government does not affect the growth, in other words, whether an ambitious 
government can increase the growth depends on the form of production function.)   
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3.5 Increase the Growth in a Model with Productive Public Capital 
Following Barro (1990), Futagami, Morita and Shibata (FMS) (1993) developed a 
similar endogenous growth model in 1993. The only difference is that the FMS model 
assumes that the tax revenue finances the public investment which is accumulated into 
public capital. In other words, the public capital rather than the public service takes a 
role in the production. The FMS model concludes that the optimal tax rate in the 
decentralised model is smaller than the rate that attains the maximum growth rate. For 
tractability, the FMS model assumes that the tax rate is time invariant. This section 
examines FMS’s conclusion by the typical Ramsey method and makes the assumption 
that the tax rate can be time variant if it is profitable for the leading player, the 
government. 
 
3.5.1 The Structure of the FMS Model 
The objective of representative household-producer is to maximise his intertemporal 
utility 
  
0
te u c dt


  (5.1) 
   lnu c c  (5.2) 
where 𝑐 is consumption,  𝜌 is the rate of time preference. 
The household-producer produces 𝑦 according to a Cobb-Douglas technology as in 
Barro (1990), Glomm and Ravikumar (1997) and Economides and Philippopoulos 
(2008). 
   1, g gy f k k Ak k    (5.3) 
where 𝑘 is private capital and 𝑘𝑔 is public capital. 𝑘(0) and 𝑘𝑔(0) are given and both 
are positive, 𝐴 is a technological scale factor, α and 1 − 𝛼 are the output elasticities of 
𝑘𝑔 and 𝑘, respectively. 
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The government’s budget constraint is  
 0 1gk y here     (5.4) 
where 𝜏 is the income tax rate.  
The household-producer’s budget constraint is  
  1k y c    (5.5) 
 
3.5.2 Decentralised Competitive Equilibrium 
The representative household-producer maximises his intertemporal utility, given tax 
rate 𝜏 and public capital 𝑘𝑔. To solve the representative’s problem, set up the current-
value Hamiltonian 
  ln 1kH c y c        (5.6) 
The transversality condition is  
 lim 0t k
t
e k 

  (5.7) 
The first order conditions are 
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 (5.8) 
(5.8) implies 
  1
y c
k c
 
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  

 (5.9) 
(5.9) is the Euler equation which can be written as  
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  1
y
c c
k
 
 
    
 (5.10) 
(5.10) and (5.5) constitute the DCE: 
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3.5.3 Long-Run Growth-Maximisation Policy 
Define the auxiliary variables: 
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 (5.12) 
On BGP in the long run, we have  
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 (5.14) 
Hence, (5.11a) becomes 
     ˆ1 1 gA k
        (5.15) 
(5.3) and (5.4) imply on BGP, 
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Substitute (5.16a) into (5.15), we have 
     1 11 1A A

          
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To maximise the growth rate γ , the left hand side of equation (5.17) should be 
maximised, then we have the solution for tax rate τ 
 
DG   (5.18) 
Where the subscript ‘DG’ denotes ‘the Decentralised model with Growth 
maximisation’. 
Proposition 3.5 A (FMS Proposition 3):  
The long-run growth rate on BGP in the decentralised model attains its 
maximum when 𝝉 = 𝜶. 
There is no closed form of 𝛾𝐷𝐺 the growth rate with the growth-maximisation policies. 
The numerical solution of 𝛾𝐷𝐺 can be obtained by 
    
1
2
1 1 11 DG DGA
 
            (5.19) 
From (5.3), (5.12b) and (5.13), we obtain the saving rate 
  
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 11ˆ
g
k k k
s A k A A A
y k y

                    (5.20) 
The saving rate under the growth maximisation is 
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            (5.21) 
The after-tax saving rate is 
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            

 (5.22) 
The after-tax saving rate under the growth maximisation is 
    
1 1
1 11 1 1 1ˆ1 1ADG DG gDG DGs A k A

       
          (5.23) 
The ratio of two types of capital under the growth maximisation is 
 
1 1 1
1 1 1ˆ
gDG DGk A
       (5.24) 
 
3.5.4 Decentralised General Equilibrium with a Benevolent Government 
In a decentralised economy, the benevolent government’s problem is to choose the 
path of tax rate 𝜏 to maximise the representative’s intertemporal utility (5.1) subject to 
the government’s budget constraint (5.4), the representative’s budget constraint (5.5) 
and the Euler equation (5.10). 
The current-value Hamiltonian for the government is  
  
 
ln
1
1
GB
kg
k
c
H c y
y c
y
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k
 
 
  
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    
 
    
 (5.25) 
Where 𝜇𝑘𝑔, 𝜇𝑘 and 𝜇𝑐 are dynamic multipliers associated with (5.4), (5.5) and (5.10) 
respectively. 
First order conditions are 
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(5.26) 
Substitute the production function (5.3) for 𝑦 into the first order conditions of the 
Ramsey problem in (5.26), then (5.26a)-(5.26g) constitute a seven-equation system in 
the paths of 𝜏, 𝑐, 𝑘, 𝑘𝑔, 𝜇𝑐, 𝜇𝑘, 𝜇𝑘𝑔. This is a general equilibrium with Ramsey second-
best allocation. 
 
3.5.5 Long-Run Decentralised General Equilibrium with a Benevolent 
Government 
The first step of traditional method of solving the long-run second-best general 
equilibrium is to make the equilibrium system stationary. (See Economides and  
Philippopoulos (2008) and Novales, Pérez and Ruiz (2014).)  
Define  
 
 
 
 
5.27
5.27
5.27
kg kg g
k k
c c
k a
k b
c c



 
 
 
 (5.27) 
The dynamic general equilibrium system becomes 
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 (5.28) 
Formed by 6 equations in the paths of 𝜏, ?̂?, ?̂?𝑔, Μ𝑘𝑔, Μ𝑘, Μ𝑐, the above system shows a 
stationary general equilibrium  with Ramsey second-best policy. 
We can obtain the long-run second-best general equilibrium by setting 
 ˆ ˆ 0kg k c gk c       (5.29) 
Substitute (5.29) into the stationary general equilibrium system (5.28), we have 
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 (5.30) 
There are 6 variables 𝜏, ?̂?, ?̂?𝑔, Μ𝑘𝑔, Μ𝑘, Μ𝑐 and 6 equations in the above system which 
characterizes the BGP for Ramsey equilibrium. This system can be solved 
numerically by setting the parameter values.  
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3.5.6 A Simple Analytical Method of Solving the Benevolent Government’s 
Long-Run Ramsey Policy 
The numerical method in the literature as in 3.5.5 is unconvincing to rebut the 
argument in Barro (1990) that the optimal tax rate is the same as the rate that 
maiximises the growth. This section deduces Proposition 5 in Futagami, Morita and 
Shibata (1993) by qualitative comparison following the Ramsey method in 3.5.4.  
We can exploit the first order condition (5.26a) which implies 
  c kg k
y
c y
k
  

 

 (5.31) 
Substitute (5.31) in (5.26b), we have 
 kg kg kg
g
y
k
  

 

 (5.32) 
On BGP in the long run, 𝜇𝑘𝑔𝑘𝑔 is a constant, hence we have 
 
kg g
kg g
k c
k c



     (5.33) 
Substitute (5.33) in (5.32), we have 
 
g
y
k
 

 

 (5.34) 
Equation (5.34) is just equation (7) in Ghosh and Roy (2004). 
(5.34) imlies 
 1ˆDB gDBA k
     (5.35) 
where subscript ‘DB’ means ‘Decentralised model with a Benevolent Government’. 
Equations (5.15) and (5.35) imply that 
    1ˆ ˆ1 1agDB DB gDBA k A k
       (5.36) 
 68 
Hence the ratios of two types of capital is  
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1 1
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 
 (5.37) 
Substitute (5.35) into (5.16b), we have  
 1 1ˆ
DB gDBA k
       (5.38) 
Substitute (5.37) into (5.38), we have 
  
1
11 1
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      
 
 (5.39) 
𝜏, 𝛾 and ?̂?𝑔 can be solved one by one numerically through (5.39), (5.37) and (5.35). 
From (5.39), we have  
 
DB   (5.40) 
Proposition 3.5B (FMS Proposition 5): 
On BGP in the decentralised model with a benevolent government, the second-
best tax rate is lower than the rate which attains the maximum growth rate. 
(5.17) shows 
dγ
dτ
> 0 when τ < α. Hence, (5.18) and (5.40) imply 
 
DB DG   (5.41) 
 (5.15) implies 
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 (5.42) 
Proposition 3.5B, (5.41) and (5.42) imply 
 ˆ ˆgDB gDGk k  (5.43) 
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With a benevolent government, the saving rate is 
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With a benevolent government, the after-tax saving rate is 
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3.5.7 Decentralised General Equilibrium with a Self-Interested Government 
The government may have its own time preference 
 
G   (5.46) 
The current-value Hamiltonian for the government is 
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 (5.47) 
First order conditions are 
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The system (5.48) is a general equilibrium with a self-interested government. This 
system includes both 𝜌 and 𝜌𝐺 .The resource allocation for the representative after the 
taxation is affected by his time preference; while the government’s decision is not 
only affected by his own time preference, but also responds to the consumption policy 
function of the household-producer.  
 
3.5.8 Long-Run Decentralised General Equilibrium with a Self-Interested 
Government 
The stationary general equilibrium system is 
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 (5.49) 
With a self-interested government, the long-run second-best general equilibrium is 
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 (5.50) 
This Ramsey system can be solved numerically by setting the values of 𝐴, 𝛼, 𝜌, 𝜌𝐺.  
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3.5.9 The Analytical Method of Solving the Self-Interested Government’s Long-
Run Ramsey Policy 
(5.48a) and (5.48b) imply 
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 (5.51) 
 1ˆ
DS gDS GA k
     (5.52) 
where subscript ‘DS’ means ‘Decentralised model with a Self-interested Government’. 
(5.15) and (5.52) imply that 
    1ˆ ˆ1 1gDS G DS gDSA k A k
            (5.53) 
Hence the ratios of two types of capital is 
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Substitute (5.52) into (5.16b), we have 
 1 1ˆDS G gDSA k
       (5.56) 
Hence  
 
DS   (5.57) 
We also have the below conclusion: 
 DS DB Gif        (5.58) 
Prove: DS DB Gif        
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∵ (5.17) shows 
dγ
dτ
> 0 when τ < α, 
∴ If 
DB DS    , we have DB DS   (P1). 
∵ 
G  and DB DS  , 
∴ (5.35) and (5.52) imply ˆ ˆ
gDB gDSk k . 
∵ 
DB DS  , 
ˆ ˆ
gDB gDSk k  and G  ， 
∵ (5.15) implies 
DB DS   (P2). 
(P1) and (P2) are contradictory. 
Hence 
DS DB Gif        
Assume 𝜌𝐺𝑃 < 𝜌 < 𝜌𝐺𝐼 , where 𝜌𝐺𝑃  is the rate of time preference of a patient 
government; 𝜌𝐺𝐼 is the rate of time preference of a impatient government. From (5.58), 
(5.17), (5.37) and (5.54), it is straightforward to obtain 
 ˆ ˆ ˆ, ,DSI DB DSP DSI DB DSP gDSI gDB gDSPk k k              (5.59) 
Proposition 3.5C:  
In the decentralised FMS model, a more patient government will tax more to 
accumulate public capital, further leads to a higher ratio of public capital to 
private capital, and finally has a higher growth rate. 
We can compare the solution under a self-interested government with the growth-
maximisation solution by the same method in 3.5.8, then we have the summary below. 
Summary (DSI vs DB vs DSP vs DG): 
 
 
 
 
5.60
5.60
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 5.60
DSI DB DSP DG
DSI DB DSP DG
gDSI gDB gDSP gDG
a
b
k k k k c
    
   
   
  
  
 (5.60) 
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3.5.10 Centralised Equilibrium with Growth Maximisation 
Because of the positive externality of ‘taxation and public investment’, the 
decentralised choices of consumption-investment are not Pareto optimal.  
However, in the centralised model, the resource allocation among consumption, 
private capital and public capital is not necessary to be optimal if the tax rate is set 
arbitrarily. If the tax rate is set arbitrarily, then the current-value Hamiltonian for the 
benevolent social planner’s problem is still the same as equation (5.6) and the Euler 
equation is still as equation (5.10).  The government is not necessary to be benevolent 
and it may have a different time preference, therefore we just replace 𝜌 by 𝜌𝐺 . 
In the decentralised model 
𝜕𝑦
𝜕𝑘
 is the private marginal return on capital before taxation, 
while in the centralised model 
𝜕𝑦
𝜕𝑘
 is the social marginal return on capital before 
taxation. The social planner regards public capital is endogenous since it comes from 
the output.  
On BGP, (5.4) imply 
 g gk k y    (5.61) 
(5.3) and (5.61) imply that the reduced form of production function is 
 
1
1 1 1y A k
 
   

    (5.62) 
Hence, the social marginal return on capital before taxation is 
 
1
1 1 1
y
A
k
 
   

  



 (5.63) 
The Euler equation becomes 
    1 11 G
c
A A
c

         (5.64) 
Hence we have 
 74 
    
1
1 1 11 GA
 
            (5.65) 
When equation (5.17) is compared with equation (5.65), only one difference on the 
left hand side is the presence of the term, 1 − α, in the former . Hence, we have the 
below proposition. 
Proposition 3.5D:  
The long-run growth rate in the centralised model is always larger that in 
decentralised for all values of tax rate. 
To maximise the growth rate 𝛾, the left hand side of (5.65) should be maximised, then 
we have the solution for tax rate τ 
 
CG   (5.66) 
where the subscript ‘CG’ denotes ‘Centralised model with Growth maximisation’. 
Proposition 3.5E:  
The long-run growth rate in the centralised model attains its maximum when 
𝛕 = 𝛂. 
The numerical solution of 𝛾𝐶𝐺 the growth rate under the growth-maximisation policies 
in the centralised model can be obtained by 
    
1
1 1 11 CG G CGA
 
            (5.67) 
Compare (5.19) with (5.67), we have 
 CG DG   (5.68) 
The ratio of two types of capital is 
 
1 1 1
1 1 1ˆ
gCG CGk A
       (5.69) 
Proposition 3.5D, (5.24) and (5.71) imply 
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 ˆ ˆ
gCG gDGk k  (5.70) 
The saving rate under the growth maximisation in the centralised model is 
 
1 1
1 1 1 1ˆ
CG CG gCG CGs A k A

            (5.71) 
The after-tax saving rate under the growth maximisation in the centralised model is 
    
1 1
1 11 1 1 1ˆ1 1ACG CG gCG CGs A k A

       
          (5.72) 
Proposition 3.5D, (5.21) and (5.71) imply 
 
CG DGs s  (5.73) 
Proposition 3.5D, (5.23) and (5.72) imply 
 A A
CG DGs s  (5.74) 
Summary （CG vs DG）: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.75
5.75
ˆ ˆ 5.75
5.75
5.75
CG DG
CG DG
gCG gDG
CG DG
A A
CG DG
a
b
k k c
s s d
s s e
  
 
 




 (5.75) 
 
3.5.11 Centralised Equilibrium with a Benevolent government  
To achieve the optimal allocation in the centralised model, the social planner’s 
problem is to choose 𝜏, 𝑐, 𝑘, 𝑘𝑔 to maximise the representative’s intertemporal utility 
(5.1) subject to the government’s budget constraint (5.4) and the representative’s 
budget constraint (5.5)  
The current-value Hamiltonian for the social planner is  
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 
ln
1
CB
kg
k
H c y
y c
 
 
 
    
 (5.76) 
First order conditions are 
 
 
   
   
 
0 5.77
1 5.77
1 5.77
1
0 5.77
G
CB
kg k
CB
kg k kg k
g g g
CB
kg k k k
CB
k
H
y y a
H y y
b
k k k
H y y
c
k k k
H
d
c c
 

     
     


  

  
    
  
  
    
  

  

 (5.77) 
 (5.77a) implies 
 
kg k   (5.78) 
On BGP, we have 
 
CB
g
y y
k k
 
 
  
 
 
  1ˆ ˆ1gCB gCBA k A k
      
 ˆ
1
gCBk




 (5.79) 
 ˆ ˆgCB gDBk k  (5.80) 
  
1
1CB A
   

    (5.81) 
 (5.35) and (5.37) imply 
  
1
11 1ˆ 1DB gDBA k A A

        


         
 
 
Hence 
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CB DB   (5.82) 
Substitute (5.79) and (5.81) into (5.16b), we have 
 
1
1
1
CB A


  


     
 
 (5.83) 
Hence 
 
CB   (5.84) 
Compare (5.39) with (5.83), we have 
 
CB DB   (5.85) 
With a benevolent government in the centralised model, (5.65) becomes 
    
1
1 1 11 CB CB CB CBA
 
            (5.86) 
 (5.86) shows 
𝑑𝛾
𝑑𝜏
> 0 when 𝜏 < 𝛼. Hence, (5.85) also implies (5.80). 
The saving rate is 
 
1 1
1 11 1 1
1ˆ 1CB CB gCB CB CBs A k A A

   

    

    
 
      
 
 (5.87) 
(5.44), (5.80), (5.82) and (5.87) imply 
 CB DBs s  (5.88) 
The after-tax saving rate is 
  
 
 
1 1
1 1 1
1 11 1ˆ1 1 1
1
A CB CB
CB CB CB gCB
CB
A
s A k A

  
      

  
         

 (5.89) 
(5.45), (5.85), (5.88) and (5.89) imply 
 A A
CB DBs s  (5.90) 
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Summary (CB vs DB): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.91
5.91
ˆ ˆ 5.91
5.91
5.91
CB DB
CB DB
gCB gDB
CB DB
A A
CB DB
a
b
k k c
s s d
s s e
 
 





 (5.91) 
(5.66) and (5.84) imply 
 
CB CG   (5.92) 
 (5.67) and (5.86) imply 
        
1
1
1 11 11 1CB CB CB CG CGA
 
           
          
 
 (5.93) 
 CB CG   (5.94) 
We also have 
 ˆ ˆgCB gCGk k  (5.95) 
Prove: ˆ ˆgCB gCGk k  
 (5.16c) implies 1 1ˆ ˆCG CG gCG gCGA k A k
        
If ˆ ˆ
1
gCG gCBk k


 

, we have  
11ˆ 1CG gCBA k A
    
   . 
Since  
1
1 1
CG G CG CG

       , then    
1
1 1 11CG G CG A
 
           . 
Equation (5.67) is violated. 
Hence, we have ˆ ˆgCB gCGk k  
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(5.95) is intuitively reasonable: 𝜏𝐶𝐺 = α, if ?̂?𝑔𝐶𝐺 < ?̂?𝑔𝐶𝐵 =
𝛼
1−𝛼
, we have ?̇? + ?̇?𝐺 > 𝑦, 
budget constraint would be violated. 
 
3.5.12 Centralised Equilibrium with a Self-Interested government  
If the social planner has a different time preference, 𝜌𝐺 ≠ 𝜌, the solution in the long 
run is obtained by replacing 𝜌 by 𝜌𝐺  in 3.5.11 
Hence 
 ˆ
1
gCSk




 (5.96) 
  
11ˆ 1CS gCS G GA k A
      
      (5.97) 
 
1
1
1
CS G A


   


     
 
 (5.98) 
 
1 1
1 11 1 1
1ˆ 1CS CS gCS CS CS Gs A k A A

   

    

    
 
      
 
 (5.99) 
  
 
 
1 1
1 1 1
1 11 1ˆ1 1 1
1
A CS CS
CS CS CS gCS G
CS
A
s A k A

  
      

  
         

 (5.100) 
(5.54) and (5.96) imply 
 ˆ ˆ ˆ
1
gCSI gCSP gDSPk k k


  

 (5.101) 
(5.52), (5.60b), (5.97) and (5.101) imply 
 DSI DSP CSP     (5.102) 
(5.16b), (5.59), (5.101) and (5.102) imply 
 DSI DSP CSP     (5.103) 
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(5.20), (5.101) and (5.102) imply 
 
DSI DSP CSPs s s   (5.104) 
(5.22), (5.103) and (5.104) imply 
 A A A
DSI DSP CSPs s s   (5.105) 
Summary (CSI vs DSI vs DSP vs CSP): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.106
5.106
ˆ ˆ ˆ 5.106
1
5.106
5.106
DSI DSP CSP
DSI DSP CSP
gCSI gCSP gDSP
DSI DSP CSP
A A A
DSI DSP CSP
a
b
k k k c
s s s d
s s s e
  
  


 
 
  

 
 
 (5.106) 
From the results in 3.5.11 and (5.96)-(5.98), we have the summary below. 
Summary (CSI vs CB vs CSP vs CG): 
 
 
 
 
5.107
5.107
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 5.107
1
CSI CB CSP CG
CSI CB CSP CG
gCSI gCB gCSP gCG
a
b
k k k k c
    
   


   
  
   

 (5.107) 
 
3.5.13 Comment 
In the FMS model, the production depends on the stock of productive public capital 
rather than on the flow of public spending as in the Barro model, therefore 
maximising the growth rate is not efficient for any type of government. There exists 
transitional dynamics in FMS model because it includes two state variables: private 
and public capital stocks, which leads to the difference in the welfare aspect of fiscal 
policy to arise between Barro’s and FMS’s outcomes. 
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Once there is a gap between growth-maximisation tax rate and welfare-maximisation 
tax rate, a farsighted government has the chance to realise its inclination and set a 
higher tax rate than the rate set by a benevolent government, so that more productive 
public expenditure is used to finance the production and thus the growth rate will be 
higher. 
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3.6 Increase the Growth in a Model with both Productive Public 
Capital and Nonproductive Public Service 
 
3.6.1 The Structure of the Model with Two Types of Expenditures 
The objective of representative household-producer is to maximise his intertemporal 
utility 
 
0
te udt


  (6.1) 
  , ln ln 0u c h c h here     (6.2) 
where 𝑐 is consumption, ℎ is the flow of public consumption expenditure,  𝜌 is the 
rate of time preference, 𝜑 is the weight given to public consumption service relative 
to private consumption. The utility function is the same as that in the Xie model (1997) 
which is discussed in Section 3.3. 
The production function, as that in the FMS model (1993), is based on a Cobb-
Douglas technology.  
   1, g gy f k k Ak k    (6.3) 
where 𝑘 is private capital and 𝑘𝑔 is public capital. 𝑘(0) and 𝑘𝑔(0) are given and both 
are positive, 𝐴 is a technological scale factor, α and 1 − 𝛼 are the output elasticities of 
𝑘𝑔 and 𝑘, respectively. 
The government’s budget constraints are 
 
 
 
 
0 1 6.4
0 1 6.4
0 1 6.4
h h
g kg kg
h kg
h y here a
k y here b
here c
 
 
   
  
  
   
 (6.4) 
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where 𝜏 is the total income tax rate, 𝜏ℎ/𝜏 is the fraction of tax revenue used to finance 
the public consumption spending, 𝜏𝑘𝑔/𝜏 is the fraction that finances the productive 
public capital. 𝜏ℎ and 𝜏𝑘𝑔 are set independently. 
The household-producer’s budget constraint is  
  1 h kgk y c      (6.5) 
 
3.6.2 Decentralised Competitive Equilibrium 
The representative household-producer maximises his intertemporal utility, given 𝜏ℎ, 
𝜏𝑘𝑔, ℎ and 𝑘𝑔. The current-value Hamiltonian for the representative is 
  ln ln 1k h kgH c h y c            (6.6) 
The transversality condition is  
 lim 0t k
t
e k 

  (6.7) 
The first order conditions are 
 
 
   
1
0 6.8
1 6.8
k
k h kg k k
H
a
c c
H y
b
k k

    

  

 
    
 
 (6.8) 
(6.8) implies the Euler equation is  
  1 h kg
y
c c
k
  
 
     
 (6.9) 
(6.9) and (6.5) constitute the DCE: 
 
     
   1
1 1 6.10
1  6.10
h kg g
h kg g
c c A k k a
k Ak k c b
 
 
   
 


     
 
   
 (6.10) 
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3.6.3 Long-Run Growth-Maximisation Policy 
On BGP in the long run, we have  
 
g
g
ky c k h
y c k h k
      (6.11) 
 
 
 
0 6.12
0 6.12
h
h
kg
kg
a
b






 (6.12) 
Hence, the long-run growth rate is 
    1 1h kg gA k k           (6.13) 
(6.3) and (6.4) imply on BGP, 
  
1
1 1g
kg
k
A
k
     (6.14) 
Substitute (6.14) into (6.13), we have 
     1 11 1h kg kgA A

             
     
1
1 1 11 1 h kg kgA
 
                (6.15) 
To maximise the growth rate γ , the left hand side of equation (6.15) should be 
maximised, then we have the solution of growth maximisation: 
 
 
 
0 6.16
6.16
hDG
kgDG
a
b

 


 (6.16) 
Proposition 3.6 A:  
The long-run growth rate on BGP in the decentralised model attains its 
maximum when 𝝉𝒉 = 𝟎 and 𝝉𝒌𝒈 = 𝜶. 
 85 
The numerical solution of 𝛾𝐷𝐺 can be obtained by 
    
1
2
1 1 11 DG DGA
 
            (6.17) 
The saving rate is 
 
1 1
1 1 1
DG DGs A

       (6.18) 
The after-tax saving rate is 
  
1 1
1
1 1 11ADG DGs A

    

     (6.19) 
When the government maximises the BGP growth rate, the model is the same as the 
FMS model. 
 
3.6.4 Decentralised General Equilibrium 
In the decentralised model, the government maximises the representative’s 
intertemporal utility with the government’s own time preference. If the government is 
self-interested, then 𝜌𝐺 ≠ 𝜌; if the government is benevolent, then 𝜌𝐺 = 𝜌. 
The current-value Hamiltonian for the government is  
  
 
ln ln
1
1
GS
h kg kg
k h kg
c h kg
H c y y
y c
y
c
k
   
  
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First order conditions are 
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(6.21a) and (6.21b) imply 
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(6.21a) implies 
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Use (6.22) and (6.23) and obtain the simplified dynamic system: 
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The first order conditions (6.24a)-(6.24h) constitute an eight-equation system in the 
paths of  𝜏ℎ, 𝜏𝑘𝑔, 𝑐, 𝑘, 𝑘𝑔, 𝜇𝑐, 𝜇𝑘, 𝜇𝑘𝑔. The system is a general equilibrium with Ramsey 
second-best allocation. 
 
3.6.5 Long-Run Decentralised General Equilibrium 
Define  
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 (6.25) 
The dynamic general equilibrium system becomes 
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 (6.26) 
There are 7 equations in the paths of 7 variables 𝜏ℎ, 𝜏𝑘𝑔, ?̂?, ?̂?𝑔, Μ𝑘𝑔, Μ𝑘, Μ𝑐  in the 
above stationary general equilibrium with Ramsey second-best policy. 
We obtain the long-run second-best general equilibrium by setting 
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Substitute (6.27) into (6.26), we have 
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There are 7 variables and 7 equations in the above system which characterizes the 
BGP Ramsey equilibrium.  
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3.6.6 The Effect of the Government’s Time Preference 
Table 2 represents that a patient government prefers to reduce the proportion of 
nonproductive public expenditure in economic output and increase the share of 
productive public investment. 
Table 2: Effect of  𝜌𝐺  on 𝜏ℎ, 𝜏𝑘𝑔, ?̂?, ?̂?𝑔, 𝛭𝑘𝑔, 𝛭𝑘, 𝛭𝑐 
𝛒𝐆  𝛕𝐡  𝛕𝐤𝐠  ?̂?  ?̂?𝐠  𝚳𝐤𝐠  𝚳𝐤  𝚳𝐜  
0.03 0.0149 0.1796 0.0922 0.4915 9.8769 3.7615 21.7782 
0.05 0.0238 0.1489 0.0912 0.4029 5.3125 4.9306 11.0069 
0.07 0.0297 0.1257 0.0903 0.3386 3.7372 9.8239 1.6174 
Notes: 𝐴 = 0.25, 𝛼 = 0.25, 𝜌 = 0.05, 𝜑 = 0.25. With 𝜑 = 0 and 𝜏ℎ = 0, we can 
have the numerical solution for FMS model in Section 3.5. 
The numerical solution of growth rate γ is obtained by (6.15). 
The saving rate is calculated by  
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k k k
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The after-tax saving rate is calculated by 
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𝑠𝑇 is defined as the ratio of total investment to output. Total investment includes both 
private and public investment.  
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Table 3 shows that, based on the assumed parameters, a patient government leads to a 
higher private saving rate 𝑠𝐴 and a higher total saving rate of the economy 𝑠𝑇, and 
thus a higher growth rate. 
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Table 3: Effect of  𝜌𝐺  on 𝛾, 𝑠, 𝑠
𝐴, 𝑠𝑇 
𝛒𝐆  𝛄 (%) 𝐬  𝐬
𝐀  𝐬𝐓  
0.03 7.6472 0.4699 0.5833 0.7009 
0.05 7.3590 0.4739 0.5728 0.6648 
0.07 7.0802 0.4762 0.5631 0.6367 
Notes: 𝐴 = 0.25, 𝛼 = 0.25, 𝜌 = 0.05, 𝜑 = 0.25. 
The higher growth rate due to a farsighted government sacrifices the welfare of 
current generation, but benefits the future generations after a certain period. The 
numerical results show that although the share of private saving in output decreases, 
but the share of private saving in disposable income increases because the reduced 
amount of nonproductive expenditure is much more than the increased amount of 
public investment, thus the representative has more disposable income and also gives 
a higher proportion to saving. Both private and public sectors are willing to invest 
more, and finally the growth rate is higher when compared with the situation under a 
benevolent government. 
 
3.6.7 Comment 
The model in this section is designed by combining the Xie model in Section 3.3 and 
the FMS model in Section 3.4, therefore, as illustrated in Table 2, a farsighted 
government has two channels to realize a higher growth rate than that achieved by a 
benevolent government: to lower 𝜏ℎ the ratio of nonproductive public expenditure in 
GDP; on the other hand, to increase 𝜏𝑘𝑔 the ratio of productive public expenditure in 
GDP.  
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3.7 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
3.7.1 Discussion  
A farsighted government would have an incentive to sacrifice the current generation 
by reducing the ratio of public consumption to GDP, giving expenditure priority to 
productivity-enhancing public expenditure and thus raising the saving rate, so as to 
increase the long-run economic growth rate and finally rival other countries by a 
higher welfare level in the future. However, there is a puzzle: future generations will 
be beneficiaries of the farsighted fiscal policy but they will prefer a benevolent 
government at their day. Therefore, it is difficult for politicians to adopt farsighted 
policies in a two-party or multiparty political system. 
The political discount rate will be higher than the private rate of time preference if 
politicians face uncertainty about next election. Therefore in western ‘democratic’ 
countries, most politicians have a shorter time horizon than households and favor 
quick boosts to electoral popularity. The fruits of productive investment, especially in 
human capital, do not occur until some time has passed, and the fruits may be 
harvested by opponent parties. The government budget is balanced in this Chapter, 
however, in practice, shortsighted politicians can increase the social welfare 
expenditure but keep the tax rates relatively low in short run to curry favour with 
voters, thus budget deficits are necessary, which will increase the tax burden of future 
generations. This is why most ‘democratic’ countries do not submit to fiscal discipline, 
the first policy recommendation of the Washington Consensus. 
The politicians could be more farsighted than households if different generations of 
politicians have the same long-run goal—the success of a political and economic 
system, which may happen in a one-party or nonpartisan system, especially when the 
government defend its political system in international ideological battles (for 
examples, in Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore from the 1950s to the 1980s, and 
currently in mainland China).   
The tax distortion is illustrated by comparing the decentralised results with centralised 
results. A lump sum tax (poll tax), with zero marginal tax rate, can reproduce the 
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Pareto optimal allocation in the centralised model in which the government is 
benevolent. In UK, Poll tax was levied by the governments of John of Gaunt in the 
14th century, Charles II in the 17th century and Margaret Thatcher in the 20th century. 
However, it was unpopular, many opponents thought it shifted the tax burden from 
the rich to the poor. (See Minford (1990).) Lump sum tax, implemented with the 
name of ‘contract responsibility system’, was a successful practice in China, partially 
supplanting the egalitarian distribution method, whereby the state assumed all profits 
and losses. The system was first adopted in agriculture in 1981 and later extended to 
other sectors of the economy, by which farmers and managers were held responsible 
for the profits and losses since they were allowed to keep profits after they submitted 
a fixed quota. In China, another instrument to exploit the positive external effects and 
avoid tax distortion is to run SOEs. The government, the owner of the SOEs, prefers a 
higher ratio of investment to output when compared with the private sectors, because 
the social marginal productivity is higher than the private marginal return on capital, 
as demonstrated in Barro (1990). 
However, with a self-interested government, lump sum tax can not replicate the 
Pareto optimal allocation in the centralised model, which differs from Barro’s 
conclusion because both of the government’s and the representative’s rates of time 
preference enter the solution of lump sum tax rate and thus the time horizon of the 
government would affect the overall utility of the representative.  
 
3.7.2 Conclusion  
The strategy of a farsighted government is to sacrifice the first several generations but 
benefit all future generations through cutting nonproductive public spending 
meanwhile promoting productive public expenditure, so that a higher growth rate 
leads to a ‘quasi-Pareto improvement’ among generations.  
Barro model is an exception, because the elasticity of substitution in the Cobb-
Douglas function is unity, which makes the maximisation of the welfare correspond to 
the maximisation of the growth, and therefore the farsighted government has no place 
to increase the growth rate.  
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There are many benefits, such as a higher long-run growth rate and higher welfare for 
future generations, if the government is more patient than the citizens. However, the 
farsighted fiscal policy together with ‘hedonistic citizens’ also leads to welfare loss 
for both the government and the citizens. The inefficiency in resource allocation is 
from both tax distortion in a decentralised economy and the divergence of time 
preference between the private and public sectors. A farsighted government had better 
seek an accommodation on a time horizon with the citizens.  
In practice, shortsighted politicians in most ‘democratic’ countries usually promote 
government consumption by budget deficits in hopes of wooing voters, otherwise, 
they cut public investment rather than social welfare spending to maintain a balanced 
budget. The long-term consequence is even worse if politicians damage public 
investment but still keep large budget deficits to finance welfare programs. It is the 
bad political system that has grievously distorted and blighted the market economy. 
This is why so many counties violate the first two prescriptions of the Washington 
Consensus: fiscal discipline and public expenditure priority to pro-growth investment. 
In contrast, the farsighted governments of Singapore and China have down-to-earth 
pragmatic concern with serving their people in the long run. 
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Appendix 3: Basic Structure and Important Results 
3.1 Introduction 
 
3.2 Increase the Growth in the Simplest Centralised AK Model  
3.2.1 The Structure of the Centralised AK Model 
3.2.2 The Centralised Equlibrium 
3.2.3 Proof of Balanced Growth Path 
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3.2.4 Comparison  
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Proposition 3.2 A: In the centralised model, the saving rate and growth rate are larger than, or 
equal to, or smaller than their counterparts in the decentralised model if the government is more 
patient than, or as patient as, or less patient than the representative.  
3.2.5 Experiment  
In the centalised regime with a farsighted government, the resource allocation sacrifices the first 
several generations but benefits all future generations. It is a ‘quasi-Pareto improvement’. 
 
3.3 Increase the Growth in a Model with Nonproductive Public Expenditure 
3.3.1 The Structure of the Xie Model 
3.3.2 Decentralised Competitive Equilibrium 
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3.3.4 Decentralised General Equilibrium with a Self-interested Government 
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Propostition 3.3A: The optimal tax rate set by the self-interested government in the open-loop 
Stackelberg game is not only time consistent, but part of a subgame perfect equilibrium, which 
ensures the DCE is on the BGP. 
3.3.5 Decentralised General Equilibrium with a Benevolent Government 
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Propostition 3.3B: In the decentralised Xie model, the less patient a government is, the higher the 
optimal tax rate is set, and the lower the growth rate reaches. 
3.3.6 Centralised General Equilibrium with Growth Maximisation  
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3.3.7 Centralised General Equilibrium with a Self-Interested Government 
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Propostition 3.3C: In the centralised Xie model, the less patient a government is, the higher the 
optimal tax rate is set, and the lower the growth rate is. 
3.3.8 Compare Decentralised Outcome with Centralised Outcome when the Government Is 
Self-Interested 
Propostition 3.3D: If 𝜌𝐺 > (1 + 𝜑)𝜌, the growth rate in the centralised model is smaller than the 
rate in the decentralised model. 
3.3.9 Effect of the Government’s Time Preference on Welfare in the Decentralised Model 
x x x x l     
Proposition 3.3E: With a farsighted government, the overall utility, the birth of the first benefited 
person in generation utility, the instantaneous utility, all living people’s generation utility exceed 
their counterparts with a benevolent government in chronological order. 
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Proposition 3.3F: The more farsighted the government is, the faster the overall utility, the 
generation utility and the instantaneous utility exceed their counterparts with a benevolent 
government. 
3.3.10 Welfare Loss with Conflicting Time Preferences  
Tax distortion is not the only reason of inefficient allocation, welfare loss is also from different 
time preferences between the representative and the government.  
 
3.4 No Chance to Increase the Growth in a Model with Productive Public Service 
3.4.1 The Structure of the Barro Model 
3.4.2 Decentralised Competitive Equilibrium 
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3.4.3 Long-Run Growth-Maximisation Policy 
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3.4.4 Decentralised General Equilibrium Solution 
Proposition 3.4A: With Cobb-Douglas production function in the Barro model, the fiscal policy 
is independent of either the representative’s or the government’s time preference. 
3.4.5 Discussion  
A farsighted government can not increase economic growth by fiscal instrument in either 
decentralised or centralised models. The key is that the elasticity of substitution in Cobb-Douglas 
production function is unity and thus maximising the growth rate is efficient.  
 
3.5 Increase the Growth in a Model with Productive Public Capital 
3.5.1 The Structure of the FMS Model 
3.5.2 Decentralised Competitive Equilibrium 
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3.5.3 Long-Run Growth-Maximisation Policy 
Proposition 3.5 A: The long-run growth rate on BGP in the decentralised model attains its 
maximum when 𝜏 = 𝛼. 
3.5.4 Decentralised General Equilibrium with a Benevolent Government 
3.5.5 Long-Run Decentralised General Equilibrium with a Benevolent Government 
3.5.6 A Simple Analytical Method of Solving the Benevolent Government’s Long-Run 
Ramsey Policy 
Proposition 3.5B: On BGP in the decentralised model with a benevolent government, the second-
best tax rate is lower than the rate which attains the maximum growth rate. 
3.5.7 Decentralised General Equilibrium with a Self-Interested Government 
3.5.8 Long-Run Decentralised General Equilibrium with a Self-interested Government 
3.5.9 The Analytical Method of Solving the Self-Interested Government’s Long-Run Ramsey 
Policy 
ˆ ˆ ˆ
DSI DB DSP DSI DB DSP gDSI gDB gDSPk k k              
Proposition 3.5C: In the decentralised the FMS model, a more patient government will tax more 
to accumulate public capital, further leads to a higher ratio of public capital to private capital, and 
finally has a higher growth rate. 
Summary (DSI vs DB vs DSP vs DG): 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
DSI DB DSP DG DSI DB DSP DG gDSI gDB gDSP gDGk k k k                   
3.5.10 Centralised Equilibrium with Growth Maximisation 
Proposition 3.5D: The long-run growth rate in the centralised model is always larger that in the 
decentralised model for all values of tax rate. 
Proposition 3.5E: The long-run growth rate in the centralised model attains its maximum when 
τ = α. 
Summary（CG vs DG）: 
ˆ ˆ A A
CG DG CG DG gCG gDG CG DG CG DGk k s s s s            
 97 
3.5.11 Centralised Equilibrium with a Benevolent government  
Summary (CB vs DB): 
ˆ ˆ A A
CB DB CB DB gCB gDB CB DB CB DBk k s s s s          
3.5.12 Centralised Equilibrium with a Self-Interested government  
Summary (CSI vs DSI vs DSP vs CSP): 
ˆ ˆ ˆ
1
DSI DSP CSP DSI DSP CSP
gCSI gCSP gDSP
A A A
DSI DSP CSP DSI DSP CSP
k k k
s s s s s s
     


   
  

   
 
Summary (CSI vs CB vs CSP vs CG): 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
1
CSI CB CSP CG CSI CB CSP CG
gCSI gCB gCSP gCGk k k k
        


      
   

 
3.5.13 Comment 
 
3.6 Increase the Growth in a Model with both Productive Public Capital and 
Nonproductive Public Service 
3.6.1 The Structure of the Model with Two Types of Expenditures 
3.6.2 Decentralised Competitive Equilibrium 
      11 1 1h kg g h kg gc c A k k k Ak k c                     
3.6.3 Long-Run Growth-Maximisation Policy 
Proposition 3.6 A: The long-run growth rate on BGP in the decentralised model attains its 
maximum when 𝜏ℎ = 0 and 𝜏𝑘𝑔 = 𝛼. 
3.6.4 Decentralised General Equilibrium 
3.6.5 Long-Run Decentralised General Equilibrium 
3.6.6 The Effect of the Government’s Time Preference 
3.6.7 Comment 
 
3.7 Discussion and Conclusion 
3.7.1 Discussion  
Future generations will be beneficiaries of the farsighted policy but they will prefer a benevolent 
government at their day. 
A lump sum tax can reproduce the Pareto optimal allocation in the centralised model in which the 
government is benevolent. However, with a self-interested government, lump sum tax can not 
replicate the Pareto optimal allocation in the centralised model, which differs from Barro’s 
conclusion.  
3.7.2 Conclusion   
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Chapter 4: Economic Relationship between the 
Government and Nongovernment Sectors in China 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Mainland China has been the fastest growing major economy since the founding of 
the People's Republic in 1949. Mainland China’s sustained and rapid economic 
growth and increased competitiveness in manufacturing and international trade have 
been underpinned by a massive capital formation. Before the early 1990s, central 
control over planning and the state ownership of financial system and certain 
important industries had enabled the government to mobilise whatever surplus was 
available and greatly increase the proportion of GDP devoted to investment. In 1992, 
Deng Xiaoping made his famous southern tour of China, using his travels as a method 
of reasserting his reformist platform after his retirement and criticising his political 
opponents who were against further reform and opening up. Subsequently the 
‘Socialist Market Economy’ was legitimised. Since 1992, private investment has been 
widely encouraged and it has made up a growing share in total investment. 
The purpose of this research is to examine the elasticity of substitution between 
government and nongovernment capital (nongovernment capital is mainly in the 
private sector after the 1978 reform), check the difference on the orientation of public 
investment between the two periods — before and after 1992, and finally discuss the 
policy implications. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: In Section 4.2 the economic 
background of the empirical work in this chapter is briefly presented. Section 4.3 
demonstrates the theoretical framework and the modified model which can be directly 
used in Dynare. Section 4.4 provides the sources of raw data and the method of data 
processing. Section 4.5 illustrates the methodology of indirect inference in testing 
models and estimation. The test and estimation results with different production 
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functions are shown in Section 4.6 and Section 4.7, respectively. In order to examine 
the change in the economic relationship between the government and nongovernment 
sectors, Section 4.8 deals with the estimations by dividing the data into two periods: 
1952 -1992 and 1993-2012. Section 4.9 gives some succinct comments on the 
empirical results and provides relevant policy implications. Finally, the conclusion is 
drawn in Section 4.10. 
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4.2 Background 
 
4.2.1 The Economic Performance of Mainland China 
Mainland China is the fastest growing major economy in the world, with remarkable 
growth rates, averaging above 8% after 1949 and around 10% over the past 30 years. 
According to the International Comparison Program (2014), under the authority of the 
United Nations and hosted by the World Bank, new GDP assessments based on 
Purchasing Power Parities (PPPs) put mainland China’s economy at 87% of the size 
of the US in 2011, and mainland China could overtake the United States as the 
world’s largest economy in 2014, occupying about 17% of the global economy. (From 
now on, ‘China’ mentioned in this chapter denotes mainland China, excluding Taiwan, 
Hong Kong and Macau.) 
Figure 1 demonstrates the six economic troughs after 1949: four of them happened 
before 1990 and were all because of political disarrays; the other two were caused by 
the external factors, the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 2008 global financial and 
economic crisis. There were large economic fluctuations before 1978. Since 1978, the 
government has realised rapid but stable economic growth. 
Production grew substantially between 1949 and the beginning of economic reform in 
1978. Without the political turmoils, China should have a higher growth rate in that 
period. However, the economic growth was accompanied by the increase of 
population. As a result, productive capacity was unable to outdistance essential 
consumption needs significantly, which offset the efforts of the government to invest 
more resources in capital goods. The relatively small size of the capital stock per 
capita led to low productivity per worker, which in turn perpetuated the lack of ability 
to generate a substantial surplus. In 1979, the family planning policy was introduced 
to alleviate social, economic, and environmental problems in China, averting more 
about 300 million births. In the post reform period, the increase in productivity rather 
than population growth has accounted for China’s economic growth. (See Chow and 
Li (2002).) Since 1949, human capital has increased stably in China. The growth of 
human capital was mainly from the growing population in the first three decades and 
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chiefly due to the increasing quality and capability of the workforce in the following 
three decades. 
Figure 1: Economic Growth Rate in China 
 
Data Source: National Data, National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
The Six Economic Troughs since 1949: 
1960: the third year of the Great Leap Forward; 1959-1961: ‘Three Years of Natural 
Disasters’ along with policy failures. 
1966: the Great Cultural Revolution. 
1976: the Tangshan earthquake; the deaths of Zhou Enlai (the Premier), Zhu De (the 
principal founder of the army) and Mao Zedong (the Chairman); Down with The 
Gang of Four.  
1989: students riot; Zhao Ziyang, the General Secretary of the Communist Party, was 
ousted from his position; Economic sanctions from Western countries. 
1997: the Asian financial crisis. 
2008: the global financial crisis. 
 
4.2.2 Investment in China 
Investment-led growth is a distinguishing feature of China’s economy. Different from 
the false impression of many people, Figure 2 reveals that investment contributes 
much more than net export in China’s economic growth. In 2009 when the closure of 
the export department resulted in redundancies, investment contributed 87.6% of the 
total economic growth, protecting China from the concussion of the global economic 
crisis. As is exhibited in Figure 3, the proportion of investment in GDP has been 
above 30% since 1970, reaching almost 50% in recent years. 
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The majority of investment was carried out by the government directly or by state-
owned entities before 1978. In the mid-1980s, nongovernment investment began to 
outpace government investment, as shown in Figure 3. In recent years, more than 80% 
of the investment has been from the nongovernment sector.  
Figure 2: Contribution Shares of the Three Components in GDP Growth 
 
Data Source: National Data, National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
Note: Contribution share of the three components in GDP increase refers to the 
proportion of the increment of each component of GDP to the increment of GDP. 
Figure 3: Investment in GDP 
 
Data Source: calculated from the raw data from China Statistical Yearbook (2001, 
2007, 2008) and National Data, National Bureau of Statistics of China  
  
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
Contribution Share of the Three 
Components in GDP Growth (%)  
Comsumption Investment Net Export
0.0000
0.2000
0.4000
0.6000
1
9
5
2
1
9
5
5
1
9
5
8
1
9
6
1
1
9
6
4
1
9
6
7
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
3
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
7
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
2
Investment in GDP 
Ratio of nongovernment investment in GDP
Ratio of government investment in GDP
Ratio of investment in GDP
 103 
4.2.3 Tax System 
Before 1978, public expenditure were chiefly from the revenues and profits of the 
SOEs. Since 1978, however, the planned quotas have been remitted and the profits 
claimed by the government have been replaced with taxes. In the beginning of the 
reform, this tax system was adjusted so that differences in the capitalisation and 
pricing situations among various firms were allowable, but more-uniform tax 
schedules were introduced in the early 1990s. After 1992, value added tax (Value 
added tax is proportional to the value realised in the production) has been the largest 
revenue resource among all tax categories. In 2012, tax revenue accounted for 85.8% 
in government revenue and most items of tax revenue are proportional rather than 
progressive. The two progressive tax categories are individual income tax and land 
appreciation tax, together occupying 8.6% of the total tax revenue in 2012.   
 104 
4.3 The Macroeconomic Model with Taxation and Public Capital 
 
4.3.1 Model Structure 
(a) The utility function:  
  
1 11 1
,
1 1
t t
t t
c h
u c h
 

 
  
 
 
 (1) 
The model adopts a transformed ‘constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution’ 
(CIES) utility function, where 𝑐𝑡  is private consumption (or nongovernment 
consumption), ℎ𝑡 is public consumption (or government consumption), σ > 0 and −σ 
is the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to private and public consumption, 𝜑 
is the weight given to public consumption service relative to private consumption in 
the utility.  
(b) The production function: 
      1 1 expr r yrt t t t Gt ty f k A k k v

          (2) 
where 𝐴𝑡 is a deterministic trend which tracks the long-run growth of human capital 
(including both quantity and quality of the labour force), 𝑣𝑡
𝑦
 is the logarithm of 
productivity shock, 𝑘𝑡 is nongovernment capital and 𝑘𝐺𝑡 is government capital. 
The homogenous Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production function was 
introduced by Arrow, Chenery, Minhas and Solow (1961). The elasticity of 
substitution measures the percentage change in factor proportions due to a percentage 
change in the marginal rate of technical substitution.  
Equation (2) is an extended CES production function which uses a CES structure to 
describe the relationship between government and nongovernment capital, but 
specifies the relationship between the broad capital and 𝐴𝑡 as the Cobb–Douglas form. 
𝛼 and (1 − 𝛼) are the share parameters for nongovernment and government capital 
respectively, (1 − 𝑟)−1  is the elasticity of substitution between the two types of 
capital, θ and (1 − 𝜃) are the output elasticities of broad capital and 𝐴𝑡, respectively.  
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If 𝑟 approaches zero, in the limit we get the Cobb–Douglas function: 
      11t exp yt t t Gt ty f k A k k v
      (3) 
(c) The nongovernment capital accumulation:  
  1 1t t tk i k     (4) 
(d) The household-producer budget constraint:  
  1t t t tc y i    (5) 
(e) The government capital accumulation: 
  1 1Gt Gt G Gtk i k     (6) 
(f) 𝑘𝐺𝑡 , 𝜏𝑡, ℎ𝑡are exogenous variables, ℎ𝑡 does not enter the solution. 
 
4.3.2 Solution of the Model with CES Production Function 
The objective function is 
  0
0
max t t
t
E u c


  (7) 
subject to equations (2), (4) and (5). 
Rewrite the problem in the form of Bellman equation. 
       
1
1 1 1
,
, , max , ,
t t
t Gt t t t t Gt t
c k
v k k u c E v k k  

        (8) 
subject to: 
        11 1 1 1 expr r yrt t t t t t Gt tc k k A k k v

              (9) 
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Derive the Euler equation 
 
   1 1 1
1 1
, , , ,
0
t Gt t t Gt t
t t
t t
v k k v k k
c E
k k
    
 
  
    
  
 (10) 
Apply envelope theorem to the first derivative of value function: 
 
       
1
1 1
, ,
1 1 exp 1
t Gt t r r r yr
t t t t Gt t t
t
v k k
c A k k k v
k

      

              
 (11) 
Hence, 
 
 
       
1 1 1
1
1
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
, ,
1 1 exp 1
t Gt t
t
r r r yr
t t t t Gt t t
v k k
k
c A k k k v

 

    
  


  
     


 
        
 
 (12) 
From equations (10) and (12), obtain: 
 
       
1
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 exp 1
r r r yr
t t t t t t Gt t tc E c A k k k v

       

   
      
   
         
   
 (13) 
Thus, we have a system with three endogenous variables 
   
       
   
1
1
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1 exp
1 1 exp 1
1 1
r r yr
t t t Gt t
r r r yr
t t t t t t Gt t t
t t t t t
y A k k v
c E c A k k k v
c y k k



  
 
     
 


   
      

    
   
         
   
    
 (14) 
Translate the system (14) into the form with Dynare timing convention 
   
       
   
1
1
1
1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1
1 exp
1 1 exp 1
1 1
r r yr
t t t Gt t
r r r yr
t t t t t t Gt t t
t t t t t
y A k k v
c E c A k k k v
c y k k



  
 
     
 



   
    

    
   
         
   
    
 (15) 
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Set 1952 as the initial period, so define  
 
 1952
1952
t
tA A 

  (16) 
 ˆ t
t
t
x
x
A
  (17) 
Hence, we have a stationary system: 
 
   
       
   
1
1
1 1
1 1 1 1
1
1
ˆ ˆˆ 1 exp
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ 1 1 exp 1
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ1 1
r r r yr
t t Gt t
r r r r r yr
t t t t t Gt t t
t t t t t
y k k v
c E c k k k v
c y k k


  
  
        
  



     
   


   
 
             
    
    
                                                                                                                                    (18) 
where  
 1
y y y
t y t tv v e    (19) 
   1expt E t t t tv where v e           (20) 
   1ˆ ˆ exp KG KG KG KGGt GE t t KG t tk k v where v v e     (21) 
 
4.3.3 Solution of the Model with Cobb-Douglas Production Function 
If the production function is in the form of Cobb-Douglas as equation (3), the system 
(15) should become 
 
   
         
   
1 1
1
11 1
1 1 1 1 1
1
exp
1 exp 1
1 1
y
t t t Gt t
y
t t t t t t Gt t
t t t t t
y A k k v
c E c A k k v
c y k k

  
       
 
 

   
    


   
    
 (22) 
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Finally, the system (18) becomes 
 
   
         
   
1
1
11 1
1 1 1 1
1
1
ˆ ˆˆ exp
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ 1 exp 1
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ1 1
y
t t Gt t
y
t t t t t Gt t
t t t t t
y k k v
c E c k k v
c y k k

  
     

     
  
 

    
   



   
    
 (23) 
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4.4 Data Sources and Data Processing  
 
This chapter employs annual data from 1952 to 2012. The raw data are collected from 
China Statistical Yearbook (2001, 2007, 2008) and National Data, National Bureau of 
Statistics of China.  
The items of raw data are: (1) Gross Domestic Product (GDP), (2) Household 
Consumption (private consumption or nongovernment consumption), (3) Gross 
Capital Formation (total investment), (4) Government Budgetary Revenue, (5) 
Government Extra-budgetary Revenue, (6) Government Expenditure by Function 
(1952-2006), (7) Main Items of National Government Expenditure of Central and 
Local Governments (2007-2012), (8) Extra-budgetary Revenue by Item (1952-2010), 
(9) Extra-budgetary Expenditure by Item. (Note: since 2011, extra-budgetary revenue 
and expenditure were included in intra-budgetary revenue and expenditure.) 
The National Bureau of Statistics of China does not directly offer the data on 
government investment. However, the figures can be approximately estimated from 
corresponding productive expenditure subitems in the items (6)-(9). Therefore 
nongovernment investment can be calculated by 
 nongovernment investment = total investment - government investment  
Based on the above nominal data, the real data are obtained by dividing the nominal 
data by the GDP deflator.  
real data = nominal data / GDP deflator  
The base year for calculating GDP deflator is 2000. GDP deflator from 1960 to 2012 
is from World Development Indicators (WDI) & Global Development Finance (GDF), 
The World Bank (issued in July, 2013); GDP deflator from 1952 to 1959 is calculated 
from the nominal GDP and indices of GDP (1952-1960). 
Tax rate is simply estimated by 
 tax rate =  budgetary revenue + extra-budgetary revenue  / GDP  
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The approach of calculating capital stock values belongs to the category of the 
conventional ‘Perpetual Inventory Method’ (PIM). The estimation technique can be 
expressed as equations (4) and (6). The value of capital stock is estimated by using the 
annual data of capital formation as the investment.  
The data of GDP, nongovernment consumption, nongovernment investment, 
government investment and tax rates are listed in Appendix 4A. 
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4.5 Methodology  
Indirect inference is a simulation-based method for estimating, or making inferences 
about, the parameters of economic models. A VAR model can be used as the auxiliary 
model. The process of indirect inference testing is to bootstrap the structural residuals 
and generate a large number of sample replications, based on which, a distribution of 
the VAR parameters is obtained, finally test whether the VAR parameters from actual 
data lies within this distribution at some level of confidence. The estimation using 
indirect inference is to choose a set of parameters for the structural model, so that, 
when this model is simulated, it generates estimates of the auxiliary model as close as 
possible to the estimates of the auxiliary model using actual data. In other words, 
indirect estimation chooses the structural parameters that can minimise the distance 
between the two sets of estimated parameters. There are many famous researchers in 
the literature, such as Smith (1993), Gourieroux, Monfort and Renault (1993), Canova 
(2005) and Le, Meenagh, Minford and Wickens (2011).  
 
4.5.1 Indirect Inference Test  
Step 1: Calculate the Innovations   
Parameters 𝛾  and 𝐴1952  should be estimated so that the deterministic trend 𝐴𝑡  is 
obtained by Equation (16) and then the stationary system (18) can be generated. 𝛾 is 
estimated on the basis of the averaging growth rates of GDP and private consumption. 
Set the shock in the first equation of system (15) as zero, substitute (16) into the 
equation, then obtain the value of ‘𝐴1952’ in each year, and thus estimate the 𝐴1952 on 
the basis of the mean value. Parameters 𝜏𝐸 in Equation (20) and ?̂?𝐺𝐸  in Equation (21) 
are estimated on the basis of the mean values of 𝜏𝑡 and ?̂?𝐺𝑡, respectively. 𝐴1952,𝜏𝐸 and 
?̂?𝐺𝐸  could be adjusted around the corresponding mean values. Parameters 𝜌𝑦 , 𝜌𝜏, 𝜌𝐾𝐺  
in (19)-(21) are estimated by AR(1) models. Finally, innovations are obtained from 
Equations (19)-(21). 
Step 2: Simulate Data   
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Save the policy functions in Dynare with the DSGE model above, and then obtain N 
sets of simulated data from the policy functions and N bootstraps of innovations. 
Step 3: Estimate the Auxiliary Model   
Use a VAR(1) as the auxiliary model, then estimate it with both actual data and the N 
samples of simulated data. 𝛽𝑎 is obtained from the actual data and includes the VAR 
parameters and the volatilities of the three variables in the VAR model; 𝛽𝑖 (i=1,2,…N) 
is obtained from one sample of simulated data; ?̅? is the average of N sets of 𝛽𝑖. The 
auxiliary VAR(1) Model  is  
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Step 4: Compute Wald Statistics   
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Compare W𝑎  with  W95𝑡ℎ  (the 95th percentile of the Wald statistics from the 
simulated data), if  W𝑎 is outside the 95% confidence interval, then the model with 
the selected parameters does not pass the test, in other words, the actual data can not 
be well explained. The model can be accepted if  
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4.5.2 Indirect Inference Estimation 
As introduced in 4.5.1, indirect inference can be employed to test whether the existing 
model with a set of parameters can generate the actual data and the Wald statistic 
measures the distance between the data and the model. However, if this set of 
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structure parameters can not explain the data well then other sets of parameters might 
be used to explain how the data is generated. If none set of parameters can be found 
under which the model passes, then the model should be rejected. Even the model has 
already passed the test, it is still necessary to seek an alternative set of parameters that 
could reduce the value of 𝑊𝑅 in (26). The main idea of indirect inference estimation 
is to seek the set of parameters which minimises the value of  𝑊𝑅. The algorithm in 
Le and Meenagh (2013) is different from that in (26), however minimising the 
statistic in Equation (3) in Le and Meenagh (2013) is identical to minimising 𝑊𝑅 here.   
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4.6 Test Results 
 
4.6.1 Test Result with CES Production Function  
The key aspects of PIM are to set the base year capital stock and to estimate the asset 
depreciation rates. Table 4 and Table 5 show that different values of initial capital 
stock and depreciation rate have been used in the literature and the choices are 
controversial.  
Any initial value of capital stock (the capital stock in 1952) with moderate 
depreciation rates makes the ratio of total capital to GDP is around 2 during the period 
after 1960, which suggests the capital-GDP ratio is about 2 (See Figure 4), similar to 
those in other countries. The GDP in 1952 was about 274 billion, therefore, the 
indirect inference test sets the initial capital stock as 600 billion Yuan with the price 
level in 2000, which is close to Wang and Fan (2000). For the estimations in Section 
4.7, the initial capital stock is allowed to be from 500 to 800 billion Yuan. 
According to the data of government and nongovernment investment in 1950s, it is 
reasonable to assume the initial capital was almost equally divided into government 
and nongovernment sectors. Hence, the initial values of the two types of capital are 
both set as 300 billion in the test.  
Table 4: Literature of Initial Capital Stock (in 2000 Prices, billion Yuan) 
Authors  Capital Stock in 1952 
Zhang (1991), cited in Zhang and Zhang (2003) 808.1 
He (1992), cited in Zhang and Zhang (2003) 186.5 
Chow (1993) 707.1 
Perkins (1998), cited in Wu (2009) 832.3 
Chow and Li (2002) 894.1 
Wang and Fan (2000) 646.5 
Zhang and Zhang (2003) 323.2 
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Table 5 privates the literature of depreciation rate in China. The selection of 
depreciation rates of both types of capital follows Zhang (2008) with 9.6% in the test, 
and the rates are in an interval from 7% to 12% for estimations. 
Table 5: Literature of Depreciation Rate in China (%) 
Authors  Depreciation Rate 
World Bank (1997) 4.0 
Perkins (1998), cited in Wu (2009) 5.0 
Chow and Li (2002) 5.4 
Wu (2004) 7.0 
Maddison (2007) 17.0 
Zhang (2008) 9.6 
The study of Luo and Zhang (2009) shows that the labour income share in GDP 
decreases from 52% in 1987 to 40% in 2006. Bai and Qian (2010) present that the 
labour income share in the industry sector increases from 34.52% to 42.21% in the 
period between 1978 and 2004. Labour income share is much lower in China than in 
the US and most of other countries, in other words, capital income share in China is 
higher than that in most of other countries.  
Since there is government capital in the production function, the elasticity of output 
with respect to total capital should be higher than the capital income share. The 
average ratio of nongovernment capital to government capital is about 5:4 in the 
period from 1952 to 2012. Hence, the value of 𝜃 is possibly in the interval from 0.55 
to 0.75. The value in testing can be set as 2/3=0.667.  
Many studies adopt a 3.0 percent or a little larger discount rate according to the real 
rate of interest on Treasury bonds or other economic figures, therefore, the rate of 
time preference is fixed as 𝛽 = 0.97 for tests with the data in China, a future-oriented 
society, and it is allowed to be between the lower bound 0.96 and the upper bound 
0.99 in estimations. 
Table 6 gives the test results with CES Production Function, showing that the model 
passes the test since the algorithm WR < 1 . Moreover, all VAR parameters and 
variances from actual data are within the 95% lower and upper bounds, in other words, 
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based on the assumed parameters, the model with CES production function captures 
the reality well. 
Table 6: Test Result with CES Production Function 
Categories Actual VAR 
Coefficients 
and Volatilities  
95% Lower 
Bound 
95% Upper 
Bound 
IN/OUT 
β11 0.8206 0.6378 1.0459 IN 
β21 0.0573 -0.0888 0.1361 IN 
β31 0.1703 -0.4056 0.5985 IN 
β12 -0.0978 -0.2880 0.3605 IN 
β22 1.0737 0.8136 1.1583 IN 
β32 -0.1834 -0.7208 0.8677 IN 
β13 0.0102 -0.0671 0.1678 IN 
β23 0.0053 -0.0528 0.0781 IN 
β33 0.9446 0.5078 1.0135 IN 
var(?̂?) 0.0268 0.0073 0.1456 IN 
var(?̂?) 0.2771 0.0218 1.1913 IN 
var(?̂?) 0.0095 0.0011 0.0285 IN 
𝑊𝑎 = 10.3766  
𝑊𝑅 =
𝑊𝑎
𝑊95𝑡ℎ
=  0.3367 <  1, the model can not be rejected. 
𝑘1951 = 3000 , 𝑘𝐺1952 = 3000 , 𝛿 = 0.096 , 𝛿𝐺 = 0.096 , 𝛽 = 0.97 , 𝜃 = 0.6667 , 
𝛼 = 0.55, 𝑟 = 1, 𝜎 = 1.5, 𝛾 = 1.08. 𝐴1952, 𝜏𝐸 , ?̂?𝐺𝐸 ,  𝜌𝑦 , 𝜌𝜏, 𝜌𝐾𝐺  are estimated by the 
methods in 4.5.1. (Note: 𝑘1951 is written according to the Dynare timing convention.) 
The figures of impulse response functions are listed in Appendix 4B. 
 
4.6.2 Test Result with Cobb-Douglas Production Function 
The test of the model with Cobb-Douglas production function adopts the same values 
of 𝑘1951, 𝑘𝐺1952, 𝛿, 𝛿𝐺 , 𝛽, 𝜃, 𝛼, 𝜎 as in the test with CES production function, while 
𝐴1952, 𝜏𝐸 , ?̂?𝐺𝐸 ,  𝜌𝑦, 𝜌𝜏, 𝜌𝐾𝐺  are estimated by the methods in 4.5.1.  
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Table 7: Test Result with Cobb-Douglas Production Function 
Categories Actual VAR 
Coefficients 
and Volatilities  
95% Lower 
Bound 
95% Upper 
Bound 
IN/OUT 
β11 0.8452 0.7330 1.0752 IN 
β21 0.0533 -0.4185 0.2196 IN 
β31 0.1856 -0.3629 0.8223 IN 
β12 -0.0144 -0.0205 0.2273 IN 
β22 1.0554 0.5347 0.8986 OUT 
β32 -0.2703 0.1446 0.9134 OUT 
β13 0.0195 -0.0700 0.1363 IN 
β23 0.0037 -0.1042 0.2141 IN 
β33 0.9489 0.4051 1.1459 IN 
var(?̂?) 0.0182 0.0059 0.0645 IN 
var(?̂?) 0.1885 0.0054 0.1130 OUT 
var(?̂?) 0.0065 0.0012 0.0224 IN 
𝑊𝑎 = 1383.2690 
𝑊𝑅 =
𝑊𝑎
𝑊95𝑡ℎ
= 46.3973 >  1 , the model is rejected. 
The figures of impulse response functions are listed in Appendix 4C. 
Table 7 shows that, with Cobb-Douglas production function, the Wald statistics from 
the test is very high. Besides, the stationary nongovernment capital cannot be captured 
well since 𝛽22, 𝛽32 and var(?̂?) are far away from the 95% lower and upper bounds. 
Hence, we can not accept the Cobb-Douglas production function under the assumed 
parameters.  
 
4.6.3 Compare Test Results with Different Values of r 
According to the testing results in Table 8, the CES production function is much better 
than the Cobb-Douglas production function, which is not surprising since CES 
production function is a general case. However, what is ‘odd’ is that the results imply the 
elasticity of substitution between the two types of capital  
1
1−𝑟
  is much high since the test 
result is better if  𝑟  is closer to unity.  
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Figure 4 may justify the ‘odd’ results. The ratio of total capital to GDP is much stable, 
while the ratio of nongovernment capital to GDP had been doubled in the six decades and 
the ratio of government capital had decreased to less than half of the initial ratio, 
suggesting there may be a strong substitution relation between the two types of capital.  
Table 8: Test Results with Different Values of r 
𝑟 value 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 
W𝑎 1383.2690 373.5062 114.4094 39.0750 16.4111 10.3766 
𝑊𝑅 46.3973 13.0236 3.9217 1.3285 0.5401 0.3367 
 
Figure 4: Ratios of Private, Public and Total Capital to GDP 
 
Note: The data is estimated by assuming 𝑘1951 = 3000, 𝑘𝐺1952 = 3000, 𝛿 = 0.096, 
𝛿𝐺 = 0.096.  
From Table 8, we can conjecture that the two types of capital are gross substitutes 
(0 < 𝑟 ≤ 1). However, we can not make a conclusion that the model with Cobb-
Douglas production function is underperformed without looking at the estimation results. 
Moreover, the model passes the test when 𝑟 = 0.8 , hence, we can not jump to a 
conclusion that the two types of capital are perfect substitutes (𝑟 = 1).   
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4.7 Estimation Results 
 
4.7.1 Estimation with CES Production Function 
Table 9 gives the estimation result with CES production function, and again the set of 
estimated parameters captures the reality well with a low Wald statistics and a low 
value of 𝑊𝑅 which is much small than 1. 
The parameters obtained from estimation are:  𝑘1951 = 2895.7031 , 𝑘𝐺1952 =
3999.2188 , 𝛿 = 0.1192 , 𝛿𝐺 = 0.0928 , 𝛽 = 0.9720 , 𝜃 = 0.7469 , 𝛼 = 0.5012 , 
𝑟 = 0.9998 ,  𝜎 = 1.6518 , 𝛾 = 1.0702 , 𝐴1952 = 4474.7984 , 𝜏𝐸 = 0.3475 , ?̂?𝐺𝐸 =
0.7048,  𝜌𝑦 = 0.7880, 𝜌𝜏 = 0.9674,  𝜌𝐾𝐺 = 0.9900. The estimated 𝑟 is close to 1, 
implying that the strong substitution between government and nongovernment capital. 
Table 9: Estimation Result 
Categories Actual VAR 
Coefficients 
and Volatilities  
95% Lower 
Bound 
95% Upper 
Bound 
IN/OUT 
β11 0.7923 0.5921 1.0131 IN 
β21 0.0775 -0.0715 0.1556 IN 
β31 0.1818 -0.3850 0.7843 IN 
β12 -0.0791 -0.3328 0.4609 IN 
β22 1.1108 0.7487 1.1839 IN 
β32 -0.3322 -1.1916 1.4248 IN 
β13 -0.0060 -0.0519 0.0780 IN 
β23 0.0112 -0.0321 0.0426 IN 
β33 0.9519 0.7459 1.1394 IN 
var(?̂?) 0.0437 0.0069 0.2048 IN 
var(?̂?) 0.3445 0.0207 1.5947 IN 
var(?̂?) 0.0036 0.0005 0.0226 IN 
𝑊𝑎 = 4.8892  
𝑊𝑅 =
𝑊𝑎
𝑊95𝑡ℎ
= 0.1502 <  1 , the model can not be rejected. 
The figures of impulse response functions are listed in Appendix 4D. 
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4.7.2 Estimation with Cobb-Douglas Production Function 
Table 10 shows that the model with Cobb-Douglas production function does not pass 
the test because the Wald statistics is very large and the value of 𝑊𝑅 is larger than 1, 
which means that any set of estimated parameters, under Cobb-Douglas production 
function, can not capture the reality well. Hence, the Cobb-Douglas production 
function is not suitable to describe the relationship between government and 
nongovernment capital. 
The parameters obtained from estimation are:  𝑘1951 = 3443.7988 , 𝑘𝐺1952 =
3998.9000, 𝛿 = 0.1138, 𝛿𝐺 = 0.1192, 𝛽 = 0.9895, 𝜃 = 0.7498, 𝛼 = 0.7703, 𝜎 =
2.2445 , 𝛾 = 1.0780 , 𝐴1952 = 4821.4015 , 𝜏𝐸 = 0.2621 ,  ?̂?𝐺𝐸 = 0.4775 ,  𝜌𝑦 =
0.8266,  𝜌𝜏 = 0.9440,  𝜌𝐾𝐺 = 0.9900.  
Table 10: Estimation Result with Cobb-Douglas Production Function 
Categories Actual VAR 
Coefficients 
and Volatilities  
95% Lower 
Bound 
95% Upper 
Bound 
IN/OUT 
β11 0.5924 0.5906 1.0549 OUT 
β21 0.1278 -0.2145 0.1744 IN 
β31 0.3969 -0.3512 1.2604 IN 
β12 0.1180 -0.0143 0.3971 IN 
β22 1.0340 0.6248 0.8915 OUT 
β32 -0.4426 -0.1252 1.2771 OUT 
β13 -0.0685 -0.0405 0.1210 OUT 
β23 0.0299 -0.0663 0.0677 IN 
β33 1.0409 0.5989 1.1862 IN 
var(?̂?) 0.0122 0.0123 0.1333 OUT 
var(?̂?) 0.1163 0.0196 0.4336 IN 
var(?̂?) 0.0032 0.0015 0.0268 IN 
𝑊𝑎 = 50.9957  
𝑊𝑅 =
𝑊𝑎
𝑊95𝑡ℎ
= 1.7445 > 1 , the model is rejected. 
The figures of impulse response functions are listed in Appendix 4E. 
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4.7.3 Estimation with Different Values of r 
The estimation results with different values of  𝑟 demonstrate that a higher value of  𝑟 
usually generates a lower value of  𝑊𝑅, which makes the model more easily pass the 
test. Table 11 gives the estimation result with 𝑟 = 0.25. Three VAR parameters and 
the variance of stationary output obtained from the actual data are outside the 95% 
confidence intervals, however, which does not prevent the model overall fitting the 
data since WR<1. Therefore we can not reject that there is potentially somewhat 
complementary relationship between government and nongovernment capital. 
The parameters obtained from estimation are:  𝑘1951 = 2873.6084 , 𝑘𝐺1952 =
3997.8014, 𝛿 = 0.1199, 𝛿𝐺 = 0.1199, 𝛽 = 0.9899, 𝜃 = 0.7499, 𝛼 = 0.7381, 𝜎 =
2.3875 , 𝛾 = 1.0705 , 𝐴1952 = 5257.6483 , 𝜏𝐸 = 0.2665 , ?̂?𝐺𝐸 = 0.4364 , 𝜌𝑦 =
0.8482  𝜌𝜏 = 0.9436,  𝜌𝐾𝐺 = 0.9900.  
Table 11: Estimation Result with r = 0.25 
Categories Actual VAR 
Coefficients 
and Volatilities  
95% Lower 
Bound 
95% Upper 
Bound 
IN/OUT 
β11 0.5671 0.5833 1.0730 IN 
β21 0.1344 -0.1816 0.1843 IN 
β31 0.4496 -0.4230 1.2262 IN 
β12 0.0637 -0.0889 0.4321 IN 
β22 1.0412 0.6608 0.9480 OUT 
β32 -0.3522 -0.3380 1.2807 OUT 
β13 -0.0709 -0.0566 0.1203 OUT 
β23 0.0303 -0.0600 0.0722 IN 
β33 1.0490 0.5875 1.1704 IN 
var(?̂?) 0.0102 0.0104 0.1352 OUT 
var(?̂?) 0.0947 0.0192 0.4601 IN 
var(?̂?) 0.0027 0.0014 0.0248 IN 
𝑊𝑎 = 29.8255  
𝑊𝑅 =
𝑊𝑎
𝑊95𝑡ℎ
= 0.9676 <  1 , the model can not be rejected. 
The figures of impulse response functions are listed in Appendix 4F. 
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4.8 Estimation in Two Periods 
 
4.8.1 Estimation with CES Production Function 1952-1992 
The small values of Wald statistics and 𝑊𝑅 in Table 12 suggest that, based on the 
data from 1952 to 1992, the model with CES production function can be accepted. All 
actual VAR Coefficients and Volatilities are within the 95% lower and upper bounds. 
The parameters obtained from estimation are:  𝑘1951 = 3499.7070 , 𝑘𝐺1952 =
3499.5117 , 𝛿 = 0.1009 , 𝛿𝐺 = 0.1048 , 𝛽 = 0.9700 , 𝜃 = 0.6063 , 𝛼 = 0.5500 , 
𝑟 = 0.9988 ,  𝜎 = 1.7406 , 𝛾 = 1.0776 , 𝐴1952 = 2945.2770 , 𝜏𝐸 = 0.4060 ,  ?̂?𝐺𝐸 =
0.9672,  𝜌𝑦 = 0.7615  𝜌𝜏 = 0.9147,  𝜌𝐾𝐺 = 0.9900. 𝑟  is close to 1, implying the 
strong substitution relationship between the two types of capital from 1952 to 1992. 
Table 12: Estimation Result (1952-1992) 
Categories Actual VAR 
Coefficients 
and Volatilities  
95% Lower 
Bound 
95% Upper 
Bound 
IN/OUT 
β11 0.4693 0.1639 0.9018 IN 
β21 0.0666 -0.0758 0.2504 IN 
β31 0.5367 -0.3910 1.1620 IN 
β12 0.0836 -0.2218 0.3566 IN 
β22 1.0169 0.8429 1.0809 IN 
β32 -0.3870 -0.7997 0.1583 IN 
β13 -0.0982 -0.1700 0.0841 IN 
β23 0.0124 -0.0225 0.1057 IN 
β33 1.0455 0.5985 1.1943 IN 
var(?̂?) 0.0241 0.0105 0.0607 IN 
var(?̂?) 0.0395 0.0165 0.1544 IN 
var(?̂?) 0.0124 0.0047 0.0216 IN 
𝑊𝑎 = 3.9566  
𝑊𝑅 =
𝑊𝑎
𝑊95𝑡ℎ
= 0.1232 <  1 , the model can not be rejected. 
The figures of impulse response functions are listed in Appendix 4G. 
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4.8.2 Estimation with CES Production Function 1993-2012 
Table 13 shows that the values of Wald statistics and 𝑊𝑅 is small, so that, based on 
the data from 1993 to 2012, the model with CES production function can be accepted. 
All actual VAR Coefficients and Volatilities are within the 95% lower and upper 
bounds. 
The parameters obtained from estimation are:  𝑘1951 = 3000 , 𝑘𝐺1952 = 3000 , 
𝛿 = 0.12  𝛿𝐺 = 0.07 , 𝛽 = 0.9760 , 𝜃 = 0.7400 , 𝛼 = 0.5536 , 𝑟 = 0.8816 ,  𝜎 =
1.3114 , 𝛾 = 1.0744 , 𝐴1993 = 57130.3394 , 𝜏𝐸 = 0.1743 ,  ?̂?𝐺𝐸 = 0.7051 ,  𝜌𝑦 =
0.9155  𝜌𝜏 = 0.9950,  𝜌𝐾𝐺 = 0.9904. The elasticity of substitution is 𝑟 = 0.8816, 
less than that in the period between 1952 and 1992. 
Table 13: Estimation Result (1993-2012) 
Categories Actual VAR 
Coefficients 
and Volatilities  
95% Lower 
Bound 
95% Upper 
Bound 
IN/OUT 
β11 0.8895 0.0322 1.0956 IN 
β21 0.0594 -0.1105 0.3160 IN 
β31 -0.2581 -0.8481 1.3448 IN 
β12 0.6383 -0.5769 1.1465 IN 
β22 0.8254 0.4165 1.1647 IN 
β32 -0.4560 -1.5088 2.4191 IN 
β13 0.2006 -0.1966 0.3798 IN 
β23 -0.0686 -0.1300 0.0713 IN 
β33 1.0200 0.4342 1.2904 IN 
var(?̂?) 0.0260 0.0017 0.0638 IN 
var(?̂?) 0.2067 0.0169 0.6743 IN 
var(?̂?) 0.0004 0.0001 0.0059 IN 
𝑊𝑎 = 10.1558  
𝑊𝑅 =
𝑊𝑎
𝑊95𝑡ℎ
= 0.3419 <  1 , the model can not be rejected. 
The figures of impulse response functions are listed in Appendix 4H. 
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4.9 Comments and Implications 
 
4.9.1 Substitution Between Government and Nongovernment Capital  
As illustrated by both test and estimation results, there is strong substitution 
relationship between government and nongovernment capital. Hence, Cobb-Douglas 
technological relationship between government and nongovernment capital may not 
be applicable to describe China’s macroeconomy, especially when the economy was 
based on the dominance of the state-owned sector before 1992. However Table 11 
shows that when 𝑟 = 0.25, the estimated set of parameters overall passes the test, 
hence we can not arbitrarily reject that there is potentially somewhat complementary 
relationship between government and nongovernment capital. 
The substitution relationship between government and nongovernment sectors was in 
line with the reality in China before 1992. Influenced by the Soviet Union, Chinese 
government nationalised virtually most private industrial enterprises during the 1950s. 
Moreover, a large proportion of government productive expenditure was poured into 
SOEs and then it turned into the capital in nongovernment sector. Under a centrally 
planned economy, the government ‘invaded’ the private sector, the difference 
between the government investment and nongovernment investment was ambiguous. 
In other words, sometimes the government did what the nongovernment sector should 
do. After 1978, the government initiated intensive reforms and private investment was 
encouraged. In 1990s, some SOEs were privatised. Nongovernment capital, especially 
private capital,  then ‘fought back’ into the field once occupied by the public capital. 
 
4.9.2 Differences Between Two Periods 
In the 1980s and 1990s, Chinese government intentionally reduced its share of GDP 
in order to allow rural and urban households and firms to have more resources and 
better incentives. Furthermore, the SOEs tended to be more market oriented, they 
could not receive public investment freely. Meanwhile, public productive investment 
flowed to infrastructure construction rather than SOEs. The government became a 
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service supplier. Government and nongovernment sectors became more 
complementary, which is verified by the estimated elasticity of substitution being 
reduced from close to 1 in the period between 1952 and 1992 to 0.8816 after 1992.  
 
4.9.3 Discussion and Policy Implications 
The merits and drawbacks of large-scale public investment thoroughly exhibited in 
the Maoist era. In that period, consumption, especially in rural areas, was contained 
by taxes and compulsory delivery quotas, which was imposed in order to finance the 
public investment and feed the urban population at low prices. Absolute 
equalitarianism totally destroyed the market forces. Enthusiasm for work was mainly 
from disciplines and political beliefs rather than economic benefits. Nevertheless, 
economic performance was a great improvement, as argued by Maddison (2007). Real 
GDP had expanded more than fivefold; human capital and labour productivity were 
also enhanced due to better education and doubled average life span; the economic 
structure was transformed with the industry’s share of GDP increasing from one tenth 
to almost one half. China achieved this despite that self-inflicted wounds hampered 
the economic growth during the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960) and the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976), and China suffered the political and economic isolation, and 
hostile diplomatic relations with both the United States and the Soviet Unions. 
Obviously, without the political instability and the economic sanctions imposed by 
some Western countries, China would have a better economic performance with the 
development effort and large-scale public investment. We can not jump rashly to the 
conclusion that the macroeconomy before the 1978 reform was a complete failure. 
However, it is safe to draw the conclusion that Deng Xiaoping’s path of opening up 
and economic reform was absolutely superior to the development strategies before the 
reform, which is supported by higher and more stable economic growth after 1978. 
Committing to continuing Deng Xiaoping’s path, the Chinese government has 
adopted tactful fiscal policies to deal with the trade-off in the public investment, as 
simply summarised in three aspects below. 
Firstly, the government decentralises the economy, partially privatises the SOEs and 
transform most of them into joint-stock companies. The state retains ownership of 
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some large SOEs but has little direct control over their operations. Moreover, the 
government does not pour the public investment into SOEs freely any longer, which 
lessens the financial burden of the government, making it possible to reduce the tax 
rate so that households and firms have more resources and better incentives. As a 
result, even higher saving and investment have been made by a gradual takeover of 
national saving from government by microeconomic agencies, and then the growth 
acceleration has been achieved by increased efficiency. 
Secondly, the government has changed the structure of public investment. By 
stopping the free injection of funds into SOEs and cutting the financial support to 
them, the government has more resources to invest in high-quality and large-quantity 
infrastructures and improve the investment environment. The government directly or 
indirectly (through SOEs) builds more expressways, international airports, high-speed 
railways and telecommunication facilities. The government has transferred from the 
competitor of the private sector to the service provider of private investors. 
Lastly, the government uses public investment, together other policies, as a tool of 
stabilising the economy when faced with slipping business confidence domestically or 
externally. Beijing’s response to the 2008 economic crisis was swift: development of 
polysilicon supplies and manufacturing technology of clean cars were declared as 
national priorities with financial supports and tax advantages. Money poured into 
manufacturers and overseas acquisition of cheap assets, resources and technology 
from state-owned companies and banks, local governments expedited approvals for 
new plants. The leveraged investment from the government and SOEs offset the 
reduction of private investment, reduced the unemployment, and finally restored 
confidence and liquidity, achieving rather high growth rates: 9.6%, 9.2% and 10.4% 
in 2008, 2009 and 2010, respectively. In 2009, 87.6% of the economic growth was 
contributed by investment. 
In brief, the successful experiences of the Chinese government are cutting directly 
investment in the competitive market, reducing the tax burden, providing better 
infrastructure facilities, and using public investment to restore macroeconomic 
stability if necessary and encouraging the economic activities of the SOEs as an 
intermediary channeling to prop private investment when faced with external crisis.   
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4.10 Conclusion 
This chapter focuses on the elasticity of substitution between government and 
nongovernment capital through testing and estimating the models with CES and 
Cobb-Douglas technologies. Both test and estimation results underscore the strong 
substitution relationship between government and nongovernment capital after the 
founding of People's Republic of China in 1949, and thus the general CES technology 
rather than the Cobb-Douglas technology is the suitable structure containing the two 
types of capittal in the production function. 
Furthermore, the estimation results corroborate the difference on the orientation of 
public investment between the two periods: before and after the legislation of 
Socialist Market Economy in 1992, revealing that the government capital has become 
more complementary to the nongovernment capital due to the deepening economic 
reform. 
The empirical results from indirect inference method, along with both failures and 
successes in the experiences of Chinese government, give meaningful policy 
implications: macroeconomic intervention in the competitive market through fiscal 
policies and government industrial monopoly should be constrained in order to 
stimulate the vitality of the households and firms; a public service-oriented 
government should be established so that the government and nongovernment sectors 
have a more complementary and less competitive relationship; when the domestic 
economy was swept by external crisis, the government should exploit public 
investment as one of the countermeasures to stabilise the macroeconomy, rescue the 
confidence of private sector, and then reduce unemployment, especially in the export 
sector. 
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Appendix 4 
 
Appendix 4A: Real Data (1952-1982) 
 
GDP Nongovernment 
Consumption 
Nongovernment 
Investment 
Government 
Investment 
Tax 
Rates 
 (100 million Yuan) (100 million Yuan) (100 million Yuan) (100 million Yuan)  
1952 2743.95 1830.64 316.79 304.33 0.28 
1953 3265.02 2096.90 433.92 351.82 0.27 
1954 3437.42 2200.91 404.76 503.21 0.30 
1955 3647.27 2415.21 325.78 561.99 0.29 
1956 4155.76 2614.73 384.82 656.55 0.29 
1957 4307.32 2769.11 455.51 673.75 0.31 
1958 5222.65 2893.04 577.80 1148.43 0.33 
1959 5683.32 2729.89 859.56 1595.84 0.41 
1960 5614.64 2858.19 371.18 1844.62 0.47 
1961 4199.66 2811.36 192.19 753.07 0.34 
1962 4004.53 2922.30 54.88 565.67 0.33 
1963 4382.73 3000.00 295.91 646.88 0.32 
1964 5134.18 3141.24 459.96 776.97 0.32 
1965 5927.81 3286.70 678.62 917.58 0.32 
1966 6563.60 3587.84 871.37 1130.74 0.34 
1967 6189.46 3773.55 589.37 895.98 0.28 
1968 5935.58 3708.58 876.18 612.63 0.25 
1969 6938.42 4037.59 633.88 1105.83 0.32 
1970 8285.03 4438.40 1239.02 1500.59 0.34 
1971 8865.18 4610.89 1397.92 1594.41 0.36 
1972 9200.22 4874.68 1237.34 1653.06 0.36 
1973 9926.67 5226.19 1481.37 1814.87 0.37 
1974 10156.17 5340.37 1607.74 1799.98 0.36 
1975 11039.78 5629.83 1997.31 1915.39 0.36 
1976 10862.36 5861.62 1778.13 1875.37 0.36 
1977 11690.03 6016.06 2033.12 1976.00 0.37 
1978 13055.95 6300.50 2170.35 2764.83 0.41 
1979 14047.65 6955.39 2212.69 2901.07 0.39 
1980 15147.02 7768.08 2663.10 2667.46 0.38 
1981 15933.42 8559.93 2956.79 2353.31 0.36 
1982 17379.53 9477.31 2425.11 3399.90 0.38 
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Appendix 4A: (continue): Real Data (1983-2012) 
 
GDP Nongovernment 
Consumption 
Nongovernment 
Investment 
Government 
Investment 
Tax 
Rates 
 (100 million Yuan) (100 million Yuan) (100 million Yuan) (100 million Yuan)  
1983 19277.89 10446.49 2812.19 3780.12 0.39 
1984 22205.95 11528.03 3381.21 4367.10 0.39 
1985 25205.59 13104.28 4916.61 4749.32 0.39 
1986 27422.42 14150.25 5888.66 4631.49 0.38 
1987 30605.63 15548.48 6518.02 4806.85 0.35 
1988 34064.36 17817.26 8212.25 4695.81 0.31 
1989 35459.77 18390.23 8715.88 4499.27 0.31 
1990 36805.64 18633.48 8779.73 4522.71 0.30 
1991 40194.69 19801.81 9937.37 4581.92 0.29 
1992 45897.51 22161.78 12154.53 5039.98 0.27 
1993 52323.29 24303.42 20128.59 3146.54 0.16 
1994 59182.05 26822.45 21295.33 3681.46 0.15 
1995 65630.71 30626.90 23446.85 4049.75 0.14 
1996 72194.53 34441.53 24405.00 4791.57 0.16 
1997 78909.90 36891.99 25798.00 4146.04 0.15 
1998 85065.79 39537.69 26950.93 4609.44 0.15 
1999 91525.87 42784.65 27914.08 5716.76 0.17 
2000 99214.55 45854.60 28668.24 6174.56 0.17 
2001 107452.40 48442.78 32285.00 6685.51 0.19 
2002 117226.20 51686.87 37634.00 6754.70 0.19 
2003 128949.74 54732.56 46312.63 6818.48 0.19 
2004 141975.26 57915.35 54122.97 7300.00 0.19 
2005 158012.11 62336.56 58264.80 8256.75 0.20 
2006 178080.54 67980.12 67335.95 9188.36 0.21 
2007 203374.38 73705.05 73950.23 10933.67 0.22 
2008 222901.15 79260.70 83867.19 14312.45 0.22 
2009 243397.69 88236.91 96675.93 20747.47 0.22 
2010 268714.23 94203.35 107513.19 22057.09 0.22 
2011 293707.51 104889.89 120040.23 21718.07 0.22 
2012 316711.44 116195.95 128529.96 25581.27 0.23 
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Appendix 4B: IRFs (Test, r=1, 1952-2012) 
To 𝑒𝑦 : 
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Appendix 4C: IRFs (Test, r=0, 1952-2012) 
To 𝑒𝑦 : 
 
To 𝑒𝐾𝐺: 
 
To 𝑒𝜏: 
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Appendix 4D: IRFs (Estimation, 1952-2012) 
To 𝑒𝑦 : 
 
To 𝑒𝐾𝐺: 
 
To 𝑒𝜏: 
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Appendix 4E: IRFs (Estimation, r=0, 1952-2012) 
To 𝑒𝑦 : 
 
To 𝑒𝐾𝐺: 
 
To 𝑒𝜏: 
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Appendix 4F: IRFs (Estimation, r=0.25, 1952-2012) 
To 𝑒𝑦 : 
 
To 𝑒𝐾𝐺: 
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Appendix 4G: IRFs (Estimation, 1952-1992) 
To 𝑒𝑦 : 
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To 𝑒𝜏: 
 
  
10 20 30 40
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
yH
10 20 30 40
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
cH
10 20 30 40
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
kH
10 20 30 40
0
0.05
0.1
vy
10 20 30 40
0
0.01
0.02
yH
10 20 30 40
0
0.005
0.01
cH
10 20 30 40
0
0.01
0.02
kH
10 20 30 40
0
0.02
0.04
kgH
10 20 30 40
0
0.05
vkg
10 20 30 40
-0.04
-0.02
0
yH
10 20 30 40
-0.04
-0.02
0
cH
10 20 30 40
-0.1
-0.05
0
kH
10 20 30 40
0
0.02
0.04
tau
10 20 30 40
0
0.1
0.2
vtau
 136 
Appendix 4H: IRFs (Estimation, 1993-2012) 
To 𝑒𝑦 : 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion  
 
5.1 Review the Main Results in Chapter 3 
The strategy of a farsighted government is to sacrifice the first several generations but 
benefit all future generations through cutting nonproductive public spending and 
giving expenditure priority to productivity-enhancing expenditure, so that a higher 
growth rate leads to a ‘quasi-Pareto improvement’ among generations. The Barro 
model is an exception in which a farsighted government has no place to increase the 
growth rate because the Cobb-Douglas production function makes maximisation of 
welfare correspond to the maximisation of the growth.  
Nevertheless, farsighted fiscal policy together with ‘hedonistic citizens’ has a side 
effect, the welfare loss for both the government and the citizens. In a decentralised 
economy, the inefficient resource allocation is caused by both tax distortion and the 
divergence of time preference between the private and public sectors. A farsighted 
government had better seek an accommodation on time horizon with the citizens.  
If the government is benevolent, a lump sum tax can reproduce the Pareto optimal 
allocation in the centralised model. However, with a self-interested government, lump 
sum tax can not realise the Pareto optimality, which differs from Barro’s conclusion.  
An instrument to exploit the positive external effects and reduce tax distortion is to 
run SOEs if they can operate efficiently. The government, the owner of the SOEs, 
prefers a higher ratio of investment to output than the private sector since the social 
marginal productivity is higher than the private marginal return on capital. 
The political discount rate will be higher than the private rate of time preference if 
politicians face uncertainty about next election. Therefore in western ‘democratic’ 
countries, most politicians have a shorter time horizon than households and favor 
quick boosts to electoral popularity. It is cheaper from an electoral viewpoint to give 
priority to government consumption rather than public investment. The sly politicians 
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even use large budget deficits to finance welfare programs in the hope of wooing 
voters. Contrarily, the farsighted leaders in Singapore and China, the two ‘quasi-
nonpartisan’ countries, have down-to-earth pragmatic concern with the long-term 
interests of their people. 
 
 
5.2 Review the Main Results in Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 examines the elasticity of substitution between government and 
nongovernment capital through testing and estimating the models with CES and 
Cobb-Douglas technologies. Both test and estimation results reveal the strong 
substitution relationship between the two types of capital, and thus the general CES 
technology rather than the Cobb-Douglas technology is the suitable structure 
containing the two types of capital in the production function. 
Furthermore, the estimation results verify the difference on the orientation of public 
investment between the two periods (pre and post 1992), showing that the government 
capital has become more complementary to the nongovernment capital due to the 
deepening reforms of SOEs and fiscal policies. 
The empirical results from indirect inference method, together with both failures and 
successes in China’s experiences during the past six decades, give meaningful policy 
implications: market forces rather than government intervention and planning should 
dominate the economy; the government should be service-oriented and market-
friendly so that the government and nongovernment sectors have a more 
complementary and less competitive relationship; nevertheless, when the domestic 
economy suffers from external crisis, the government can temporarily employ 
Keynesian stimulation to stabilise the macroeconomy, recover the confidence of 
private sector, and then reduce unemployment. 
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5.3 The Link Between Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 
As illustrated in Chapter 3, there is a trade-off in the effects of government investment: 
On the one hand, economic growth is negatively affected by the rising cost of 
distortionary taxation necessary to finance the productive expenditure. On the other 
hand, the government could increase the growth rate by raising the investment ratio in 
output for three reasons. Firstly, the development of public infrastructures induces 
higher future returns to private investment and hence encourages private investment. 
Secondly, if the government is more farsighted than the citizens, it will allocate a high 
proportion of output in SOEs to reinvestment since the operations of SOEs are more 
or less controlled by the government. Thirdly, the government is enthusiastic over 
investment because it considers the external effect, as demonstrated by the centralised 
models in Chapter 3. 
If government and nongovernment capital are perfect substitutions, the conclusions 
derived from the endogenous growth models in Chapter 3 would be somewhat 
different and both shortcomings and advantages of public investment are strengthened. 
In such a situation, the government investment only distorts the decisions of the 
nongovernment sector via the distortionary tax, but does not increase the returns to 
private production because there is no complementary relationship between public 
and private capital. This is the logically compelling argument of privatisation. 
However, the government can act more swiftly and more decisively to stabilise the 
economy through increasing public investment in the recessions and cutting 
investment in the economic booms, because the public investment could turn into 
output without being accompanied by the resources in private sector. 
The part of public capital as substitutes of nongovernment capital once dominated 
complementary public capital in China, however there still existed infrastructure 
investment before the reform although its share in total public investment was rather 
lower than later. Moreover, empirical results do not reject somewhat complementary 
relation between the two types of capital. Hence all conclusions based on 
‘complementary public spending’ in Chapter 3 are tenable even when we research 
China’s macroeconomy. 
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5.4 Suggestion to Further Research 
Due to the problems in availability and accuracy of data, Chapter 4 employs a simple 
exogenous growth model to investigate the elasticity of substitution between 
government and nongovernment capital. If relevant data are available, further 
extension should decompose the public capital into two parts as substitute and 
complement of nongovernment capital, and also use a CES utility function to allow 
for a degree of substitutability between government and nongovernment consumption. 
On the basis of the empirical results of Chapter 4, using a general CES production 
technology and a linear production function as a special case for the models in 
Chapter 3 should be considered. Many studies in the literature assume that public 
goods are subject to congestion. If congestion effects are allowed in the production 
function and utility function, there may be more interesting implications. 
 
 
5.5 General Conclusion  
When public faith in the efficacy of markets and the competence of politicians is 
shaken in the West, the policy makers in Beijing still believe in the power of market, 
however they are convinced that the market economy and an ambitious government 
can coexist. The current political system in the capitalist West rather than the market 
machanism is the key factor that seriously distorts and blights the economy. 
The leaders of the Communist Party are still studying the outstanding civilised 
achievements in both economic and political fields from Western countries, however, 
they do not have blind faith in the market fundamentalism, not mention to the political 
models in the West. They accept a more general proposition that strategies need to be 
tailored to the specific circumstances of individual nations, nevertheless, they do not 
reject the proposals of reform under the pretext of national conditions. This is the 
primary hallmark of the Beijing Consensus if there really exists the Beijing Consensus 
as an alternative development philosophy to the currently dominant ideology.   
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